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Warnings are one of the primary ways that administrative agencies
enforce the law. Yet there is virtually no scholarship interrogating the
role that warnings play in an agency's arsenal. Are they effective in
motivating compliance? If so, under what circumstances? Is reliance
on warnings warranted at all? This Article tackles these important but
overlooked questions.
Economic models ofpublic enforcement suggest that warnings have
no role in motivating compliance. Published data on the effectiveness
of warnings is virtually nonexistent. Yet, in an apparent act of faith,
administrative agencies rely heavily on warnings-often as their
primary enforcement mechanism. This Article scrutinizes this use of
warnings, through both a theoretical assessment and a case study of
their efficacy in one particular context-the Federal Animal Welfare
Act. After showing that warnings issued under the Animal Welfare Act
ftequently fail to incentivize compliance, the Article then assesses why
this might be and discusses the implications of this failing for the many
administrative agencies that rely on warnings. It also makes policy
recommendations for improving the efficacy of warnings, including
recommendations about disclosure that are especially timely given
recent moves by the federal government to delete thousands of
enforcement-related records from its websites.
"Laws without enforcement are just good advice. "
-attributed to Abraham Lincoln
"[A] threat has no deterrent value unless it is credible that it will be
carried out. . . . "
-Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 186 (2000).
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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 15, 2013, Josh Souza, a Missouri-based commercial dog breeder,
received an official warning from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
for a host of direct and repeat violations of the Animal Welfare Act's (AWA)
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minimum standards. 2 The warning cautioned, "[a]ny further violation of these
federal regulations may result in the assessment of a civil penalty, criminal
prosecution, or other sanctions." 3 Six months later, having failed to come into
compliance with the law, Souza did not face any of the threatened actions but,
instead, received another warning from the agency. 4 After receiving the second
warning, Souza continued to violate welfare standards, including the very same
standards for which he had received warnings for violating. Souza's violations
included failing to provide shade to dogs who were "panting heavily and had
lolling tongues" in 127 degree (F) heat5 and failing to provide shelter from wind,
rain, and snow while the wind chill was 16.2 degrees F. 6 A USDA inspector
observed a dog shivering and holding up his paws. 7 Souza was also cited for
failing to provide veterinary care to dogs with severely matted fur, which can
cause pain, discomfort, and skin sores, and interfere with insulation;8 failing to
provide veterinary care to an extremely thin dog with protruding shoulder, hip,
and spine bones and sunken flanks as well as hair loss, blisters, and nails curling
into the pads of his feet; 9 and holding dogs in an enclosure with feces covering
85% of the floor.10 All told, between February 24, 2014 and July 21, 2016, the
USDA inspected Souza thirteen times and cited him for forty-five violations."
Despite this, the agency never proceeded to pursue "a civil penalty, criminal
prosecution, or other sanctions" as it had twice warned in 2013.12
Is the example of Souza and the USDA aberrant? Is it typical?
Administrative agencies frequently use warnings like the ones the USDA issued
to Souza-i.e., notifications that the law appears to have been violated and that,
if such violations persist, enforcement action may follow-in lieu of more
serious enforcement actions. But these warnings present something of a puzzle.
As economists Timo Goeschl and Johannes Jarke note, and Souza's case
typifies: "[I]t is not at all obvious why it may be in the interest of an enforcer
with a compliance objective to respond to a breach of law or regulations with a
2 Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Official Warning of
Josh L. Souza (May 15, 2013).
3 d.
4 Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Official Warning of
Josh L. Souza (Nov. 5, 2013).
5 Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Inspection Report of
Josh L. Souza 1 (July 21, 2016).
6Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Inspection Report of
Josh L. Souza 3 (Feb. 19, 2015).
7Id. at 4.
8Id. at 1.
9 Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Inspection Report of
Josh L. Souza 1 (Feb. 17, 2015).
10 Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., supra note 6, at 4.
11 Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Inspection Reports of
Josh L. Souza (Feb. 24, 2014-July 21, 2016).
12 Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., supra note 2; Animal & Plant Health
Inspection Serv., supra note 4.
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warning that imposes no cost on the wrong-doer."' 3 Despite this puzzle, and
despite the prevalence of administrative warnings, virtually no legal scholarship
has attended to their efficacy in motivating compliance behavior.
This Article fills that gap in the literature by scrutinizing administrative
reliance on warnings both theoretically and in practice, first parsing what
economic and other models of enforcement suggest about warnings, and then
analyzing the impact of warnings in a particular regulatory context-the Federal
Animal Welfare Act. The AWA regulates the treatment of more than 2.5 million
animals1 4 at nearly 11,000 locations' 5 across the United States, and is primarily
enforced through warnings.16
The AWA was selected for analysis for a number of reasons, including the
strong public interest in animal welfare, the breadth of the law, the ready
availability of considerable records on both inspections and enforcement
actions, and the author's expertise in the statute. Notably, these records-
thousands of documents related to AWA enforcement that had been available
online for many years-were recently deleted from the USDA's website.' 7 The
13 Timo Goeschl & Johannes Jarke, The Warnings Puzzle: An Upstream Explanation,
44 J. REG. ECON. 339, 340 (2013).
14 Out of more than 2.5 million regulated animals, 820,812 were used for research alone
in fiscal year 2016. ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
ANNUAL REPORT ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR (June 2017), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/
animal welfam/downloads/reports/A nual-Report-Animal-Usage-by-FY2016.pdf[https://perma.
cc/3BST-37C4].
15 OFFICE OF BUDGET & PROGRAM ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 2018 USDA
BUDGET EXPLANATORY NOTES FOR COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS: ANIMAL AND PLANT
HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE 20-49, 20-139 (2017) [hereinafter 2018 EXPLANATORY
NOTES], https-//www.obpausdagov/20aphisexnotes2O018.pdfittps9/pemaccl8V97-RPDV].
16 In fiscal year 2017, warnings comprised 157 of 173 AWA enforcement actions taken,
or 91%. Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., Animal Care Enforcement Summary (A WA
and HPA), U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., https-//www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/business-
services/ies/iesperformancemetrics/ies-ac enforcementsummary [https://perna.cc/GNA3-
9WGN] (last modified Nov. 9, 2017); see also OFFICE OF BUDGET & PROGRAM ANALYSIS,
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 2015 USDA BUDGET EXPLANATORY NOTES FOR COMMITTEE ON
APPROPRIATIONS: ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE 20-50 (2014)
[hereinafter 2015 EXPLANATORY NOTES], http://www.obpa.usda.gov/20aphis2015notes.pdf
[https//perma.cc/R5HJ-2S7N].
17 See Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., Animal Welfare Enforcement Actions,
U.S. DEP'T AGRIC.,
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalwelfaneenforcementactions [https://perma.cc/
WQT2-RBQA] (last modified Aug. 18, 2017) ("Based on our commitment to being
transparent, remaining responsive to our stakeholders' informational needs, and maintaining
the privacy rights of individuals, APHIS is implementing actions to remove documents it
posts on APHIS' website involving the Horse Protection Act (HPA) and the Animal Welfare
Act (AWA) that contain personal information.. . . These documents include inspection
reports, research facility annual reports, regulatory correspondence (such as official
warnings), lists of regulated entities, and enforcement records (such as pre-litigation
settlement agreements and administrative complaints) that have not received final
adjudication."); see also Delcianna J. Winders, Fulfilling the Promise of EFOIA's
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outcry from all corners-not just animal advocates but members of Congress
from both sides of the aisle, 18 industry representatives,1 9 media outlets, 20 and
Affirmative Disclosure Mandate, 95 DENvER L. REv. (forthcoming 2018),
https://ssm.com/abstct-3136093 [https://perma.ccVX78-QPPV]; Animal & Plant Health
Inspection Serv., Animal Care Information System Website Review Chart, U.S. DEP'T
AGRIC., https//www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalwelfare/sa awa/acis-table
[https://perma.cc/XP2F-ESX9] (last modified Aug. 18, 2017) (indicating that enforcement
records will not be reposted); Meredith Wadman, USDA Blacks Out Animal Welfare
Information, SCIENCE (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/0 2 /
trump-administration-blacks-out-animal-welfare-information [https://perma.cc/L6Z2-
TFL2]. The author is a plaintiff in two lawsuits challenging this blackout. See Complaint for
Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Perdue,
No. 18-cv-00887 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 2018); Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief,
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 285 F. Supp. 3d
307 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-5074 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 21, 2018); Delcianna J.
Winders, Opinion, Why I Sued the USDA, HILL: CONGRESS BLOG (Feb. 16, 2017),
httpJ//thehill.com/blogs/congress-blogjudicial/319916-why-i-sued-the-usda [https-//perma.cc/
AVS4-G4H3].
1 8 See Karin Brulliard, Resistance Is Growing to the USDA's Blackout of Animal
Welfare Records, WASH. POST: ANIMALIA (Feb. 16, 2017), https-//www.washingtonpost.com/
new/animalia/wp/2017/02/16/resistance-is-growing-to-the-usdas-blackout-of-animal-welfare-reco
rds/?utm term=.eb756a4254e7 [https://perma.cc/W697-5NG2] ("[T]his week, 18 Senate
Democrats sent a letter to the department's acting deputy, Michael Young, urging a reversal
of the decision. A day later, nearly 100 House members sent a similar letter to President
Trump asking him to 'immediately restore' the records. Eleven Republicans were among
those signing.. . .").
19 See, e.g., Nation's Best Zoos and Aquariums Disagree with Decision To Remove
Online Access to USDA Inspection Reports, ASS'N Zoos & AQuARIUMS (Feb. 6, 2017),
https://www.aza.org/aza-news-releases/posts/nations-best-zoos-and-aquariums-disagree-with-decis
ion-to-remove-online-access-to-usda-inspection-re [https://perma.cc/X2WG-ERU7] (reporting
the statement of primary U.S. accreditor of zoos and aquariums condemning the blackout)
("Public disclosure of relevant animal care and welfare information represents our license to
operate and is essential for ensuring the public's trust and confidence in our profession,
enabling the public to distinguish the best animal care facilities from poorly run breeding
farms and roadside zoos and menageries ... ."); PetlandReacts to USDA Decision, PETLAND
(Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.petland.com/news/2017-2-6b.htm [https*//permacciNN9Q-TWA7]
(reporting the statement of large reseller of dogs bred by AWA licensees noting the burdens
imposed on it and similarly situated entities by the blackout); The USDA 's Removal of
Information About Animal Research Is a Step Backwards for Transparency, SPEAKING
RESEARCH (Feb. 7, 2017), https://speakingofresearch.com/2017/02/07/the-usdas-removal-of-
infornaion-about-animal-research-is-a-step-backwards-for-transparency/[https://pema.cc/VUZ6-
8EER] (raising concerns about the blackout) ("We believe the availability of data can foster
an environment of openness and transparency about animal research. When information is
hidden, particularly where it was once available, the public will naturally wonder why many
stakeholders have cause for concern: the public wonders what is being hidden and why, and
researchers must devote even more resources to combatting the public perception that they
are not transparent.").
20 See, e.g., Editorial Board, USDA Puts Blinders on Animal Abuse: Our View, USA
TODAY (Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/02/15/animal-welfare-
cruelty-website-usda-database-editorials-debates/979506 40 / [https://perma.cc/2RN9-5E78];
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others-made clear that animal welfare remains deeply important to the
American public. When the AWA was passed in the mid-sixties, Congress
received more mail about animal welfare than civil rights and the Vietnam War
combined.2 1 The immense attention recently brought to bear on the website
blackout22-and near-universal condemnation of the move-underscore that
strong public concern about animal welfare persists.
The AWA was passed in 1966 to address "the shocking failure of self-
policing by the medical community" to ensure the humane treatment of animals
used in medical research. 23 Congress amended the statute in 1970 to extend its
protections to animals used for exhibition and the wholesale pet trade,24
emphasizing that it was again acting in response to immense public interest. 25
The stated purpose of the AWA is to ensure the humane care and treatment
of animals used for regulated purposes, 26 and it does so by requiring that those
engaged in such purposes become certified with the USDA and submit to
unannounced inspections. If the agency determines that violations documented
during inspections warrant further action, it uses a variety of approaches,
ranging from informal to formal. The "formal" enforcement actions used by the
USDA to address AWA violations range from an official warning to a formal
administrative complaint seeking relief such as monetary penalties, and license
suspension or revocation in an administrative proceeding. Warnings are by far
the primary enforcement action used by the agency.27
The case study presented in this Article indicates that the USDA's use of
warnings as a means of encouraging compliance with the AWA is largely
failing-that the example of dog breeder Josh Souza is not aberrant. Facilities
Register's Editorial, Feds Shield Animal Abusers Through Information Blackout, DES
MOINES REG. (Feb. 16, 2017), htps:/www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/editorials/2017/
02/16/editorial-feds-shield-aninal-abusers-th ugh-information-blackout/97993587 [https//perma
.cc/4PQ3-AUWX].
2 1 Forward to ANIMAL WELFARE ACT 1966-1996: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND
FuTuRE DIRECTIONs, at vii, vii (Michael Kreger et al. eds., 1998). Similarly, a 1966 Life
Magazine article on conditions at dog-dealer facilities generated more letters to the magazine
than any of its stories on Vietnam or civil rights. Christine Stevens, Laboratory Animal
Welfare, in ANIMALS AND THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS 66, 74 (4th ed. 1990).2 2 See, e.g., supra notes 17-20.
23 112 CONG. REC. 13,893 (1966) (statement of Sen. Monroney).
2 4 Animal Welfare Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560; 7 U.S.C. § 2131(1)
(2012).
2 5 See Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(en banc) ("The Congressmen who went on the House floor to introduce the act that first
extended the AWA to cover animal exhibitions recognized that their bill 'ha[d] been a focal
point of concern among animal lovers throughout the Nation for some time' . . . . Indeed,
Congress had placed animal exhibitions within the scope of the AWA after hearings
documenting how inhumane conditions at these exhibitions affected the people who came
and watched the animals there." (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 40,159 (1970) (statement of Rep.
Mizell))).
26 7 U.S.C. § 2131.
2 7 See 2015 EXPLANATORY NOTES, supra note 16, at 20-50 to 20-51.
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that received warnings were more likely to commit six or more subsequent
violations than they were to commit zero to one. Nearly 40% of all facilities that
received warnings were subsequently cited for six or more violations of the
AWA. And more than one quarter committed one or more direct violations-
violations that have or are likely to have a serious or severe adverse effect on an
animal's health and well-being-after receiving a warning.
Given these findings, and suggestions in the literature that credibility is a
key element in establishing the effectiveness of a warning, this Article also
examines the rate and severity of subsequent enforcement actions for repeat
violators of the AWA-i.e., what repercussions those who disregarded agency
warnings faced. Again, Souza's example proves unexceptional: repeat warnings
were by far the most prevalent subsequent enforcement action. In the rare case
where penalties were assessed, they were discounted from the statutory
maximum by 96.4% on average-that is, for every dollar in potential penalties
enforceable upon these repeat offenders, they paid just 3.6 cents on average.
This Article reveals a serious enforcement failure. Given the prevalence of
warnings as an enforcement tool across administrative agencies, and the paucity
of information about their effectiveness, it is likely that similar failures are
occurring in a host of other contexts. The Article concludes not with a call to
abandon warnings altogether, but with policy recommendations to render them
more effective in motivating compliance, with particular attention to the
potential role of targeted disclosure, a particularly important issue given the
recent trend toward nondisclosure and secrecy where disclosure and
transparency were previously the norm.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II discusses administrative warnings
generally. It first establishes the prevalence of warnings as an enforcement tool
and then situates warnings within the existing literature, both theoretical and
empirical. The Article then aims to tackle two interrelated issues raised in this
literature: the puzzle that warnings present to public enforcement theory, and
the paucity of empirical analysis of the efficacy of warnings. It does so by
analyzing the compliance behavior of facilities regulated under the Federal
Animal Welfare Act following the receipt of official warnings. Accordingly,
Part ifi provides background on the AWA-its scope and purposes, how it is
implemented, and the various mechanisms utilized to enforce the Act. Part IV
then presents a case study of the compliance behavior of regulated facilities
following their receipt of warnings for past AWA violations. The analysis also
considers the frequency and severity of subsequent enforcement actions faced
by the high proportion of facilities that continued to violate the AWA after
receiving warnings. Part V discusses the implications of the case study's
findings for both the USDA and administrative agencies more generally, and
makes recommendations for policy and further study.
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II. WARNINGS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT
A. The Prevalence ofAdministrative Warnings
As economists Timo Goeschl and Johannes Jarke have noted, "[t]he
frequent use of warnings by regulators is an empirical fact in the enforcement
of laws and regulations. Research on the activities performed by individual
inspectors or by enforcement agencies on a day-to-day basis consistently ranks
issuing verbal or written warnings to wrong-doers near the top." 28
Warnings are prevalent "across widely different regulatory areas." 29 For
example, warnings are frequently used in the context of environmental law. 30 A
study of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) enforcement of the
Clean Water Act found that 70% of enforcement actions were informal "non-
punitive actions which involve only a notice or warning that a regulatee is, or
may be, in violation of the law."31 A 2012 EPA memo urged staff to consider
increasing reliance on notices of violation and warning letters in the early stages
of enforcement proceedings 32 "as possible ways of maximizing its enforcement
resources." 33
State environmental agencies similarly rely heavily on warnings. "By some
estimates, more than 90[%] of state enforcement actions are concluded prior to
issuance of administrative penalties or ajudicial referral." 34 An analysis of state
and local enforcement of air and water quality regulations found that "[w]hen a
violation is discovered, by far the most common response is for the agency to
28 Goeschl & Jarke, supra note 13, at 339-40 (citing Robert A. Kagan, Regulatory
Enforcement, in HANDBOOK OF REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 383,387 (David H.
Rosenbloom & Richard D. Schwartz eds., 1994)); see also Karine Nyborg & Kjetil Telle,
The Role of Warnings in Regulation: Keeping Control with Less Punishment, 88 J. PUB.
ECON. 2801, 2802 (2004) (noting "the popularity of warning policies among regulators").29 Goeschl & Jarke, supra note 13, at 340.
30 Heather Eckert, Inspections, Warnings, and Compliance: The Case of Petroleum
Storage Regulation, 47 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 232, 232 (2004) ("In Canada and the
United States it is common for environmental regulators to respond to a detected violation
by issuing a warning rather than prosecuting the violator.").
31 Goeschl & Jarke, supra note 13, at 349 (citing Susan Hunter & Richard W.
Waterman, Determining an Agency's Regulatory Style: How Does the EPA Water Office
Enforce the Law?, 45 W. POL. Q. 403, 409-10 (1992)).3 2 Albert Ferlo & Tom Lindley, Essay, Practical Impacts of the Sackett Decision, 42
ENVTL. L. 1009, 1020 (2012) (citing Memorandum from Pamela J. Mazakas, Acting Dir.,
Office of Civil Enforcement, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Regional Enf't Offices & Personnel 1
(June 19, 2012), https://www.agc.org/sites/default/files/Giles-Memo-RE-CWA-Section-
309a-ComplOrder-Aft-Sackett.pdf [https://perma.cc/QU5M-NLAY]).
33 Craig N. Johnston, Essay, Sackett: The Road Forward, 42 ENVTL. L. 993, 1004-05
(2012).
34 Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation,
Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 93 (2002); see also id at 94, tbls.1 &
2 (showing types of enforcement over years under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act and the Clean Air Act).
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send the firm a Notice of Violation (NOV), ordering it to return to compliance
but taking no further action." 3 5 A survey of state level enforcement activity
found that "most states levied penalties for less than 5[%] of the notices of
violation (NOVs) issued each year." 3 6 For example, Oregon's Agricultural
Water Quality Management Program relies primarily on "advisories and
warnings," only rarely initiating formal enforcement actions.37 Thus, 96% of the
program's compliance actions were a warning of some sort, while only 4% rose
to the level of more formal enforcement. 38
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) also relies heavily on warnings.
According to the FDA's Regulatory Procedures Manual, "[t]he Warning Letter
is the agency's principal means of notifying regulated industry of violations and
achieving prompt voluntary correction." 39 In fiscal year 2015, the FDA issued
17,232 warning letters and sought only twenty-one injunctions.40 The number
of warnings issued by the FDA also steadily increased, from 673 in fiscal year
2010, to 4,882 in 2012, to 6,760 in 2013, and 17,232 in 2015.41
35 Winston Harrington, Enforcement Leverage when Penalties Are Restricted, 37 J.
PUB. ECON. 29, 30 (1988).
36 Id.
3 7 OR. DEP'T OF AGRIC., OREGON AGRICULTURAL WATER QUALITY REPORT 21 (Sept.
2012), htps://www.oregon.gov/ODA/shared/DocumentsPublicafions/NaturalResources/ORAgW
aterQualityReport.pdf [https.//pernacc/2T3W-DVEN].
3 8 1d at 20, tbl. 2 (reporting 400 warning-type actions (letter of compliance, advisory
action, or letter of warning) and seventeen formal actions (four civil penalties and thirteen
notices of noncompliance)).
3 9 U.S. FDA, REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL § 4-1-3 (2017),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICEC/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual
/UCM074330.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB64-WL5F].
4 0 U.S. FDA, FDA ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS SUMMARY: FISCAL YEAR 2015,
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/EnforcementActions/UCM48 4 4 00 .pdf
[https://perma.cc/3PZP-L4TR]. The vast majority of these warnings were issued by the
FDA's Center for Tobacco Products (CTP). See id; see also Joshua D. Lee, Note,
Reconsidering the Traditional Analysis: Should Buckman Alone Support Preemption of
Fraud-on-the-FDA Exceptions to Tort Immunity?, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 1055,
1094 (2014) ("In 2011, the number of warning letters issued nearly tripled from 673 issued
in 2010 to 1720 issued in 2011; however, 1040 of those warning letters were issued by the
FDA's newly-formed Center for Tobacco Products (CTP) for tobacco products, after
Congress gave the FDA authority over tobacco products in 2009. The CTP issued 4146
letters in 2012 and 6052 letters in 2013." (footnotes omitted)). However, warnings are also
the predominant enforcement tool used by other FDA programs. See, e.g., James Springer,
The Success of the Citizen Suit: Protecting Consumers from Inaccurate Food Labeling by
Amending the Federal Food, Drug, and CosmeticAct, 68 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 401,416 (2013)
("[T]he Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition ('CFSAN') in fiscal year 2008, issued
134 warning letters for food related violations, yet only sought 3 injunctions and in fiscal
year 2011, CFSAN warning letters for food violations increased to 324, yet injunctive
enforcement increased to 12." (footnotes omitted)).
41 U.S. FDA, supra note 40; see also Stewart Eisenhart, FDA Data Shows Increase in
Warning Letters to Medical Device Firms Since 2005, EMERGO (May 8, 2013),
http-//www.emergogroup.com/blog/2013/05/fda-data-shows-increase-waring-letters-medi
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The USDA also uses warnings as a primary enforcement tool. For example,
in enforcing the AWA in fiscal year 2017, the agency's Animal Care division
issued 157 warnings, entered into fourteen settlement agreements, and filed just
two administrative complaints, meaning that warnings comprised more than
90% of enforcement actions filed.42 Animal Care also relied heavily on
warnings in enforcing the Horse Protection Act (HPA) in fiscal year 2017: out
of 401 enforcement actions, 213-or 53 0/-were warnings.43 In fiscal year
2016 warnings comprised 98% of all HPA enforcement actions.44 The USDA's
Food Safety Inspection Service also issues warnings under the Federal Meat
Inspection Act (FMIA) and Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), although
information about the number of warnings issued under these statutes does not
appear to be readily available.4 5
Other federal agencies that use warnings as an enforcement tool include the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 46 the Department
of Transportation, 47 and numerous others.4 8
Administrative agencies outside of the United States similarly rely on
warnings. For example, as economists Karine Nyborg and Kjetil Telle explain,
"[t]he environmental monitoring and enforcement policy in the [United
Kingdom] has also been one of conciliation and repeated warnings, where
prosecution has been saved for cases of noncooperativeness and persistent
failures to comply." 49 A study of enforcement actions taken against Flemish
cal-device-firms-2005 [https-//permacc/8FEV-NQ43] (noting steady increase in warning letters
issued by FDA specifically to medical device manufacturers); Alexander Gaffhey,
Enforcement Trends Reveal Record-High Warning Letter Issuances, Common Violations,
REG. Focus 2 (Aug. 2012), http://www.raps.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id-
5050 [https//permacc3N7V-ZNXP] ("Warnings sent to drug manufacturers rose significantly
between 2010 and 2010 [sic], with FDA sending 175 Warning Letters in 2011-the highest
number in more than a decade."); Shannon Pettypiece, Drug Advertising Being Toned Down,
TELEGRAM.COM (Jan. 31, 2010), http-//www.telegram.com/article/20100131/news/1310527
[https://
perma.cc/YX5Y-REHJ] ("[Tlhe agency issued 41 warning letters to drug makers, or almost
double the number in 2008.").
42 Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., supra note 16.
4 3 Id.
4See id.
4 5 See 21 U.S.C. § 676(b) (2012) (authorizing the agency to handle FMIA violations
through written warnings); id. § 462 (same for PPIA).
4 6 See 15 C.F.R. §§ 904.400-.403 (2017) (setting forth policies and procedures for
issuance and use of written warnings for violations of all statutes administered by NOAA).4 7 See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §§ 107.309 (2015) (establishing procedures for written warnings
for probable pipeline safety violations); id § 190.205 (2016) (same).4 8 See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. pt. 766, supp. 1 (2017) (explaining how the Office of Export
Enforcement may use warning letters for apparent violations of Export Administration Act);
33 C.F.R. § 1.08-5 (2017) (establishing procedures for issuance of written warnings by Coast
Guard boarding officers).
4 9 Nyborg & Telle, supra note 28, at 2802 (citing KEITH HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND
ENFORCEMENT 130-31 (1984)); see also RICHARD MACRORY, REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT
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textile companies for violations of environmental regulations found that "in
almost ninety percent of the cases where an enforcement action was taken a
warning was given to the violator."50 And under the Norwegian Pollution
Control Authority's enforcement policy, "standard procedure is to send a
warning letter" when an inspection reveals pollution permit requirement
violations.5 1
Is such heavy reliance on warnings warranted? The next Subparts begin to
explore that question.
B. Theorizing the Role of Warnings
1. Warnings Under the Traditional Model ofEconomic Enforcement
The traditional economic model used in public enforcement literature posits
that entities will only comply with the law "as long as the marginal cost of doing
so is less than the expected marginal penalty." 52 Under this model, as economist
Heather Eckert succinctly explains, "[a] site will comply if c<pF, where c is the
site's cost of compliance, p is the detection (inspection) probability, and F is the
fine." 53 Accordingly, "increasing the compliance level requires an increase in
either the probability of an inspection or the fine." 54
Importantly, "there is no role for warnings in reducing violations" in this
model.55 "If a regulator responds to violations with a warning, F = 0, and any
site with positive compliance costs will violate." 56 Put more colloquially, "[i]f
potential violators know that they will get a second chance, why should they
bother to comply at all before receipt of the warning?"5 7 Accordingly, as
economists Timo Goeschl and Johannes Jarke explain:
[W]arnings have presented something of a puzzle to economists.... [I]t is not
at all obvious why it may be in the interest of an enforcer with a compliance
objective to respond to a breach of law or regulations with a warning that
imposes no cost on the wrong-doer.. . .As a result, the standard economic
AND GOVERNANCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 30 tbl. 1.1 (2d ed. 2014) (showing prevalence
of warnings across a range of U.K. administrative agencies).50 Sandra Rousseau, The Use of Warnings in the Presence of Errors, 29 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 191, 191 (2009) (citing Sandra Rousseau, Timing of Environmental Inspections:
Survival of the Compliant, 32 J. REG. ECON. 17, 26 (2007)).
51 Nyborg & Telle, supra note 28, at 2802.
52 Id at 2801.
53 Eckert, supra note 30, at 236.
54 Id
551d; see also id at 236 n.9 ("There are explanations for the existence of warnings in
this type of model, but not for their effectiveness at reducing noncompliance.").
56 Id at 236.
57 Nyborg & Telle, supra note 28, at 2802; see also Harrington, supra note 35, at 31
("[I]f enforcement activity is carried on at such a low level, and if violations are rarely
punished even if discovered, why would any firm bother to comply?").
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model of public enforcement has remained largely silent on the issue of
warnings. 58
On this view, it would appear irrational for regulatory agencies to issue
warnings in lieu of penalties, and we should expect warnings to have no effect
on compliance behavior. However, as discussed in the next Subpart, some
scholars have urged a move away from a strict economic model to account for
other factors that may inform regulated entities' compliance behavior. These
models, in turn, may provide a meaningful place for warnings.
2. Socio-Legal Studies, Responsive Regulation, and the Turn Away from
a Strict Economic Model
For years, a debate has raged between scholars advocating for a coercive
regulatory approach and those urging a more cooperative approach. 59 The
coercive approach is premised on the economic model discussed above, which
holds that "regulated entities are rational economic actors whose principal
motivations include maximization of profits." 60 Proponents of a more
cooperative approach, sometimes referred to as "compliance assistance,"
contend that regulated entities are not solely motivated by a fear of detection
and punishment and that there is great value in establishing and maintaining a
cooperative relationship between regulator and regulatee. According to this
view, an overly "'sanction-oriented' response to noncompliance may make
regulated entities 'resentful' and less likely to cooperate with regulators in the
future." 6 1
58 Goeschl & Jarke, supra note 13, at 340; see id at 350 ("[Widespread use of warnings
has] been identified as an anomaly within the standard theory of public law enforcement: As
a first-order approximation, a breach of regulations should always attract punishment by an
enforcer with a compliance objective, unless the enforcer decides not to pursue the offender
at all. The use of warnings, which are costly to the enforcer and costless to the offender, is
therefore puzzling."); see also Eckert, supra note 30, at 232 ("[T]he traditional framework
does not provide an active role for warnings . . . .").59 See, e.g., Michael Faure, Effectiveness of Environmental Law: What Does the
Evidence Tell Us?, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 293, 327 (2012) ("A lot of
theoretical literature has dealt with the question of whether authorities should be hard on
polluters and should prosecute all cases, often referred to as the deterrence model, or whether
negotiations between the polluter and the enforcer, whereby the agency tries to bring the
polluter to compliance through persuasion and by providing information, referred to as the
cooperation model, can be more effective."); Thomas 0. McGarity, When Strong
Enforcement Works Better than Weak Regulation: The EPA/DOJ New Source Review
Enforcement Initiative, 72 MD. L. REV. 1204, 1274-89 (2013) (discussing the debate and the
arguments on both sides).60 Robert L. Glicksman & Dietrich H. Earnhart, Depiction of the Regulator-Regulated
Entity Relationship in the Chemical Industry: Deterrence-Based Vs. Cooperative
Enforcement, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 603, 612 (2007).
61Id at 617 (citing CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT & THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 68 (2003)).
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Although this debate continues to some extent, as Sidney A. Shapiro and
Randy S. Rabinowitz have noted:
Most analysts are convinced that both cooperation and punishment are
necessary to optimize enforcement efforts. For these analysts, the crucial
question is "not which enforcement strategy regulators should use-
cooperative or punitive-but when." Thus, regulators must "distinguish
between 'bad' and 'good' firms.. . and employ the tools of punitive and
cooperative enforcement. . . , thereby maximizing the virtue of each approach
while minimizing their vices." 62
As socio-legal scholar Robert A. Kagan and his colleagues have explained,
research has found that concerns about detection and legal punishment are not
the sole factors motivating businesses, but are intertwined with other
motivational factors, principally "concern about the consequences of acquiring
a bad reputation; and a sense of duty, that is, the desire to conform to internalized
norms or beliefs about right and wrong." 63 In their view, the traditional, rational-
actor economic model oversimplifies the motivations of regulated entities and
ignores part of the picture.M
62 Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy S. Rabinowitz, Punishment Versus Cooperation in
Regulatory Enforcement: A Case Study of OSHA, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 713, 724 (1997)
(alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting JOSEPH V. REES, REFORMING THE
WORKPLACE 176 (1988)).
63 Robert A. Kagan et al., Fear, Duty, and Regulatory Compliance: Lessons from Three
Research Projects, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE 37,37 (Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann
Nielsen eds., 2011); see also Glicksman & Eamhart, supra note 60, at 623-24 ("The
cooperative approach to enforcement proceeds on the premise that regulated entities react to
a variety of motives that include not only maximizing the bottom line, but also
'internaliz[ing] the general societal norms about environmental protection,' taking advantage
of good compliance records to enable a firm to market itself as green, and creating an image
of environmental responsibility that may attract investment." (footnote omitted) (quoting
RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 61, at 215)).
6 The framework offered by Kagan et al. is not without its critics. While beyond the
scope of this Article, it is worth noting that some have raised concerns about the publicity
effects operating as sanctions without due process. See, e.g., Third Amended Complaint at
43, Contender Farms, L.L.P. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. 4:16-cv-01630-O (N.D. Tex. Oct.
3, 2016). However, even the fiercest critics of "agency threats" have acknowledged that they
are generally not judicially reviewable. See, e.g., Ethan W. Blevins, Life in the Law's
Shadow: Due Process in the World of Rule by Threat, 27 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 1, 28
(2016) ("A threat, though often speaking in certain terms, will usually be considered a
tentative or interlocutory action-one that begins the enforcement process but has no legal
consequences in itself. Thus, the threat itself does not trigger judicial review under the
APA."); see also Rhea Lana, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, 824 F.3d 1023, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
("Agencies routinely use such letters to warn regulated entities of potential violations before
saddling them with expensive and demanding enforcement actions. Treating such reminders
of regulated parties' legal obligations as final and judicially reviewable agency action would
discourage their use, 'quickly muzzl[ing] ... informal communications between agencies
and their regulated communities . . . that are vital to the smooth operation of both
government and business."' (quoting Indep. Equip. Dealers Ass'n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
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The reputational concerns that Kagan et al. suggest we attend to are
comprised of pressures for responsible performance "from neighbours,
employees, community groups, the news media and environmental advocacy
groups," all of which "could generate adverse publicity." 65 These pressures are
intertwined with and largely based on a foundation of government regulation
and enforcement, which provide "benchmarks for criticizing firms that appear
to have violated them." 66 "Moreover, by publicizing a violation, social license
enforcers amplify an official legal sanction's impact and deterrent weight.
Adverse publicity concerning regulatory violations can erode the 'reputational
capital' that most firms work hard to build and protect."67
Normative concerns, in turn, are described as "[c]ivic duty motivations,
including the felt obligation to comply with [the] law" separate from fear of
punishment.68 Like reputational concerns, normative motivations also largely
derive their governing standards and expectations from legal rules and a
prospect of enforcement. 69
If the compliance behavior of regulated entities is motivated by a complex
mix of factors, not simply fear of detection and punishment, then regulators
seeking to incentivize compliance should attend to that mix of factors. As Ayres
and Braithwaite have suggested, "Government should ... be attuned to the
differing motivations of regulated actors" and "should respond to industry
conduct." 70 Their approach, which they call "responsive regulation," calls for a
context-specific view of "what triggers regulatory intervention" as well as "what
372 F.3d 420, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2004))); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 956 F. Supp. 2d 198, 212 (D.D.C. 2013) ("[A]gency actions that merely warn
regulated entities are not considered to be [judicially reviewable] final agency actions, as
they do not 'determin[e] rights or obligations' nor do 'legal consequences flow' from them."
(citing Holistic Candlers & Consumers Ass'n v. FDA, 664 F.3d 940, 944-45 (D.C. Cir.
2012))), aff'd sub nom. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 786 F.3d 34(D.C. Cir. 2015).65 Kagan et al., supra note 63, at 42.66 Id
671d; see also Sally S. Simpson et al., An Empirical Assessment of Corporate
Environmental Crime-Control Strategies, 103 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 231, 239 (2013)
("When reputational damages stem mainly from formal legal proceedings, this can be seen
as part of a deterrence strategy. However, informal sanctions also impose stigmatic,
commitment, and attachment costs for managers who violate the law. These effects may be
a direct consequence of formal sanctions or completely unrelated to formal
proceedings. ... [A] study of corporate offending intentions ... found inhibitory effects
associated with the certainty of internally imposed informal sanctions (shame) and externally
imposed informal sanctions (loss of respect from family, friends, and business associates).
Importantly, the threat of both individual and firm reputational damage had an inhibitory
effect. But these effects were independent of and tended to trump formal sanction risks(which were relatively unimportant sources of deterrence)." (footnotes omitted)).6 8 Kagan et al., supra note 63, at 44-45.69 Id at 41.
7 0 IAN AYREs & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 4 (1992).
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the response should be." 7 1 Responsive regulation "proposes a principled way in
which to combine the insights from plural theories of compliance and
enforcement, including those that propose people comply only when they
calculate it is in their self-interest to do so, and those that see people complying
for normative or social reasons." 72 Responsive regulation "has been explicitly
adopted by a wide range of regulators." 73
Responsive regulation, Ayres and Braithwaite have suggested, can be
accomplished through an enforcement pyramid. As depicted below:
Most regulatory action occurs at the base of the pyramid where attempts are
initially made to coax compliance by persuasion. The next phase of
enforcement escalation is a warning letter; if this fails to secure compliance,
imposition of civil monetary penalties; if this fails, criminal prosecution; if this
fails, plant shutdown or temporary suspension of a license to operate; if this
fails, permanent revocation of license. 74
71 jd
72 Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen & Christine Parker, Testing Responsive Regulation in
Regulatory Enforcement, 3 REG. & GOvERNANCE 376, 376 (2009) (citations omitted).
73 Id. at 376-77.
74 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 70, at 35-36. License revocation is at the top of
the pyramid, as it incapacitates through "corporate capital punishment." Id at 53.
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Figure 1: Ayres and Braithwaite's Enforcement Pyramid
LICEN
REVOCATIO
I.CENSE
SUSPENSION
CRIMINAL PENALTY
CMIL PENALTY
WARNING LETTER
PERSUASION
With an enforcement pyramid, the vast majority of regulatory interactions
are cooperative, but this cooperation relies fundamentally on the ability of the
State to escalate enforcement-"[l]op the tops off the enforcement pyramids and
there is less prospect of self-regulation, less prospect of persuasion as an
alternative to punishment."7 5 Under this model, "the greater the heights of
punitiveness to which an agency can escalate, the greater its capacity to push
regulation down to the cooperative base of the pyramid." 76 Also important is the
ability to provide gradual escalation. As Ayres and Braithwaite explain, when
agencies have only extremely punitive enforcement options-such as
completely shutting down a business-"it is politically impossible and morally
unacceptable to use it with any but the most extraordinary offences. Hence, such
agencies often find themselves in the situation where their implied plea to
'cooperate or else' has little credibility."7 7 Thus, "compliance is most likely
7 5 Id. at 38-39.
7 6 Id. at 40.
7 71d. at 36; see also Todd Lochner & Bruce E. Cain, Equity and Efficacy in the
Enforcement of Campaign Finance Laws, 77 TEx. L. REv. 1891, 1901-02 (1999) ("[T]he
ability ... to impose-or threaten to impose-a variety of enforcement
sanctions . .. ensur[es] that the [regulatory] agency is not forced to choose between low-cost,
low-impact remediation and high-cost, high-impact criminal sanctions.").
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when regulators (1) have access to an armory of deterrent and incapacitative
weapons, and (2) when they avoid both the mistake of selecting a sledge hammer
to swat a fly and selecting a flyswatter to stop a charging bull." 78
This approach-which scholars have deemed "the most sustained and
influential account of how and why to combine deterrent and cooperative
regulatory enforcement strategies" 79-also allows for the possibility that not all
violations of the law are deliberate. As Todd Lochner and Bruce E. Cain note,
the pyramid "approach is often appropriate because it recognizes an obvious
reality of most regulatory environments"-that "many regulatees violate the law
by accident or misunderstanding rather than by design."8 0 Kagan et al. similarly
note that regulatory enforcement officials have found that most violations "stem
from inattention or miscalculation of risks by particular company subunits or
employees, or by unexpected technical or business pressures that induce harried
subunit managers or employees to postpone or modify time-consuming
regulatory compliance routines."8 1 In such scenarios, warnings might be
sufficient to bring companies back into compliance. Relatedly, Murat C.
Mungan has suggested that warnings may be optimal and socially desirable
where individuals are uninformed about the illegality of the act at issue as they
"are meant to give notice to or caution individuals who are presumed to lack
information regarding a certain issue." 82 Used in this way, warnings can
incentivize compliance at a low cost while also preserving a sense of
cooperation between the government and the regulated entity, who may perceive
enforcement where they are uninformed to be unfair, thereby "weakening the
social ties between citizens and law enforcers." 83
Returning to Kagan et al.'s framework of the three principal factors
motivating compliance by regulated entities, the issuance of a warning can have
significant reputational and normative implications. If warnings are made
public, they can generate the adverse publicity that firms try hard to avoid. This
concern alone might motivate a regulated entity to avoid a warning even if it
carries no true legal penalty. Likewise, if, as Kagan et al. suggest, firms have
7 8 AYREs & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 70, at 52.
79 Nielsen & Parker, supra note 72, at 377.
80 Lochner & Cain, supra note 77, at 1903-04; see also Faure, supra note 59, at 328
("Criminological research in the Netherlands has shown that many violations of
environmental regulation do not take place willfully, but rather as a result of a lack of
information or knowledge. In these cases where companies lack adequate information, a
deterrence approach may fail and a cooperative enforcement style could be more effective.
This was also confirmed in a recent experimental study by Alpizar and others who showed
that there are substantial learning effects, meaning that compliance with the desired pollution
reduction targets is substantially higher in a second period when the firm was accurately
informed about the contents of their obligations." (footnote omitted)).
81 Kagan et al., supra note 63, at 47.
82 Murat C. Mungan, Optimal Warning Strategies: Punishment Ought Not To Be
Inflicted Where the Penal Provision Is Not Properly Conveyed, 9 REV. L. & ECON. 303, 305
n.6 (2013) (citing Warning, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1615 (8th ed. 2004)).83 1d. at 306.
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normative motivations separate from a fear of penalties, a warning may suffice
to motivate compliance.
Thus, the enforcement pyramid approach allows for the existence of both
"good apples" and "bad apples," balancing cooperation and coercion. As
Shapiro and Rabinowitz explain, while
regulators should cooperate with firms that attempt in good faith to comply
with agency regulations, they must also aggressively punish lawbreakers that
do not act in good faith. Such enforcement is necessary to deter firms that do
not intend to comply and to ensure continued compliance by those firms that
voluntarily comply. In other words, there is an enforcement paradox. An
agency will not be able to engage in effective cooperation unless it is
committed to aggressive pursuit of serious lawbreakers ... .84
Punishment, then, plays a crucial role; without it the system collapses.
Warnings are effective because they convey a credible threat of future
enforcement in the face of continued noncompliance.8 5 Indeed, one empirical
study found that "credible legal sanctions" are one of the single "most effective
regulatory levers." 86 As the Supreme Court noted in distinguishing the mere
availability of civil penalties and the actual imposition thereof in Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., "a threat has no
deterrent value unless it is credible that it will be carried out." 87
Without credibility, warnings are essentially meaningless.8 8 Shapiro and
Rabinowitz explain:
8 Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 62, at 729.85 See John T. Scholz, Managing Regulatory Enforcement in the United States, in
HANDBOOK OF REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 28, at 423, 426
("Flexibility in enforcement can potentially compensate for the inherent inefficiency of
uniform regulations when applied to heterogeneous settings. However, flexibility can only
develop after a credible deterrence threat has been established."); see also MACRORY, supra
note 49, at 29 ("[A]dvice and incentives should play a key role in ensuring regulatory
compliance, and should normally be the first response of regulators. Nevertheless, an
effective sanction regime plays an equally vital role in a successful regulatory regime. It
underpins the regulator's advisory functions, and its very existence will often act as an
inducement to compliance without the need to invoke the formal sanctions."); William L.
Andreen, Motivating Enforcement: Institutional Culture and the Clean Water Act, 24 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 67 (2007) ("Vigorous enforcement is a critical component of any credible
environmental protection program."); George Gilligan et al., Civil Penalties and the
Enforcement of Directors' Duties, 22 U. NEw S. WALES L.J. 417, 426 (1999) ("[T]he
regulator must accept the reality of non-compliance and be prepared to move 'up' the
enforcement pyramid.").
86 Simpson et al., supra note 67, at 232.8 7 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 186
(2000).
88 Zinn, supra note 34, at 89 ("The firm may be deterred from remaining
noncomplian[t] by the risk that the agency will eventually impose penalties, but that deterrent
effect must be minimal where the agency consistently follows a cooperative strategy.").
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[I]f a regulated entity lacks sufficient incentives to comply voluntarily with
agency regulations, a cooperative enforcement approach is not likely to induce
compliance. To the contrary, the agency's failure to punish the firm results in
its continued noncompliance. Unless the firm's incentives are shifted by the
imposition of penalties, its managers have no reason to change their behavior.89
Further, "the failure to punish violators can lead to less voluntary
compliance" by the "good apples": "If regulatory agencies fail to detect and
punish violators, other firms will decline to comply because cooperation will
put them at a competitive disadvantage with the noncompliers."9 0 In other
words, enforcement serves, in part, "as a defense of the legitimacy of the
governmental intervention that sustains voluntary compliance."91
Thus, follow-up on administrative warnings is essential to their
effectiveness. 92 In short, "[u]nless regulated entities comply with the obligations
imposed on them by the ... laws, or are forced to answer for noncompliance,
89 Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 62, at 723-24; see also MACRORY, supra note 49,
at 71 ("Failure to follow up notices to check that compliance has been reached can
undermine . .. [warnings] as a sanctioning tool, and could encourage reluctant businesses
not to take them seriously."); Lochner & Cain, supra note 77, at 1901 ("[T]he
regulator . .. must develop a reputation for imposing prompt and costly legal sanctions if the
regulated entity fails to keep its bargains."); Scholz, supra note 85, at 442 ("Persuasion
begins with a solid enforcement program. As many enforcement officials have observed, a
strong voluntary compliance program has to hit hard at the bad apples to keep them from
spoiling the good ones who 'comply voluntarily.' . . . The persuasive strategy requires the
agency to use maximal enforcement with firms that have established a record of poor
compliance in the past . . . ."); Michelle Welsh, Civil Penalties and Responsive Regulation:
The Gap Between Theory and Practice, 33 MELB. U. L. REV. 908, 914 (2009) ("If resort to
the persuasive measures located at the base of the pyramid does not achieve the desired
result, the regulator must be prepared to advance to a higher level in the pyramid.").
90 Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 62, at 724 ("In her examination of tax
enforcement, for example, Margaret Levi stresses that active prosecution of violators is
crucial because perceptions of 'exploitation' will encourage noncompliance." (citing
MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE 53 (Brian Berry et al. eds., 1988))); see also Kagan
et al., supra note 63, at 52 (noting that one important function of enforcement is "its
reassurance effect ('you're not a fool to comply; we are really looking for and finding the
bad apples')"); McGarity, supra note 59, at 1278 ("Strict deterrence-based enforcement
levels the playing field for maximal compliers who err on the side of compliance with the
environmental laws. To the extent that they get away with conduct that violates the law,
flouters and minimal compliers obtain a competitive advantage over maximal compliers that
can be reflected in the prices of their competing products." (footnote omitted)); Scholz, supra
note 85, at 443 ("The more mistakes the agency makes in ... failing to prosecute bad [firms],
the less the incentive to cooperate.").
9 1 JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA 2 (rev. ed. 2012).
92 See MACRORY, supra note 49, at 44 ("[F]ollow up ... is of particular importance for
low-level enforcement actions such as warning letters or enforcement/improvement notices,
where I am concerned that lack of follow-up on the part of regulators means that they are not
taken seriously and credibly by firms.").
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those laws will represent an impressive-looking edifice that in reality is little
more than an empty lot fronted by a flimsy facade." 93
C. Paucity of Empirical Data on the Efficacy of Warnings
Despite a robust literature on the relative theoretical merits of coercive and
cooperative regulatory enforcement approaches, there is surprisingly little data
on the actual efficacy of either approach. As Robert L. Glicksman and Dietrich
H. Earnhart have noted:
For all the debate that the recent emphasis on cooperative approaches to
assuring compliance with the environmental laws has engendered, relatively
little empirical research has been directed at a comparison of the traditional,
deterrence-based (or coercive) enforcement approach and the cooperative
enforcement approach to inducing compliance with environmental regulatory
obligations. 94
Numerous other scholars have similarly noted the paucity of empirical data in
this area.9 5
The efficacy of warnings specifically is even more severely understudied.
Despite their prevalence, we know remarkably little about whether warnings
actually work to incentivize compliance. As Nyborg and Telle have remarked,
"There is a considerable literature on enforcement of regulations, but we know
of no analysis explicitly analyzing the role of warnings. . . . The role of
warnings ... seems largely ignored in the economics literature ... ."96 Given
the dearth of such analysis, Eckert notes that "little is understood about the role
93 Glicksman & Earnhart, supra note 60, at 605.
94 Id. at 608.
95 See, e.g., Victor B. Flatt & Paul M. Collins, Jr., Environmental Enforcement in Dire
Straits: There Is No Protection for Nothing and No Data for Free, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
55, 62 (2009) ("Despite the major shift in theories regarding enforcement in the last two
decades, empirical analyses and testing of these strategies have been limited."); Nielsen &
Parker, supra note 72, at 377 ("Researchers have rarely sought to set out general, empirically
testable rules about being a 'responsive' regulator."); Scholz, supra note 85, at 426-27
("Although studies of police behavior have conceptualized a range of alternative
enforcement techniques and compiled systematic empirical evidence about differential
effectiveness, regulatory enforcement studies have focused primarily on the very basic
deterrence question of whether enforcement activities in general (primarily inspections,
citations, and penalties) are related to increased compliance and the accomplishment of
policy goals, theory development has been left at a level of generality that is of little direct
relevance to the choices made by enforcement officials." (citations omitted)); Shapiro &
Rabinowitz, supra note 62, at 720 ("There is little empirical evidence on the relative
effectiveness of cooperative and legalistic enforcement policies. Most of the evidence is
anecdotal and open to dispute." (footnote omitted)).96 Nyborg & Telle, supra note 28, at 2803; see also Rousseau, supra note 50, at 191
("Informal enforcement instruments, such as warnings and advices, are only rarely studied.
Warnings are, nonetheless, often used as an enforcement instrument. . . .").
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and effectiveness of warnings as an enforcement tool."97 As a result, agencies'
heavy reliance on warnings "has been more of an act of faith than a rational
policy choice." 98
The limited research on cooperative approaches generally suggests caution.
Shapiro and Rabinowitz note that "[t]he policy evidence is equivocal concerning
the extent to which such agency cooperation increases regulatory compliance.
Other evidence, however, suggests that substantial reliance on cooperation may
decrease compliance."99 Specifically, they suggest that "[a] mix of anecdotal
and empirical evidence warns that cooperative approaches can decrease
compliance if agencies permit law breakers to go unpunished." 00 They cite a
Canadian study that "found that the same employers continued to violate health
and safety regulations despite lenient treatment,"101 and an empirical study
which compared compliance in the pulp and paper industries in Canada and the
United States found lower compliance rates in Canada, which the author
attributed to the fact that Canadian enforcers were more lenient than their
American counterparts when addressing noncompliance.1 02 Notably, in both of
these studies it appears that the enforcement bodies were not escalating penalties
in the face of ongoing noncompliance, making it unsurprising that the
noncompliance persisted and suggesting a need for close examination of effects
of meaningful escalation and credible threats on compliance behavior.
With this background in mind, this Article aims to contribute to the virtual
void in scholarship on the efficacy of warnings. Given the pervasive use of
warnings as an enforcement tool-indeed, often as the primary enforcement
tool-by administrative agencies today, the lack of information about their
effectiveness is astonishing. More information is urgently needed if our
regulatory approaches are to be effective and efficient. Toward that end, this
Article analyzes the use and efficacy of warnings in the context of the most
97 Eckert, supra note 30, at 234.
98 Glicksman & Earnhart, supra note 60, at 608 n.24.
9 Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 62, at 716.
100Id. at 722.
101Id. (citing Richard Brown, Theory and Practice of Regulatory Enforcement:
Occupational Health and Safety Regulation in British Columbia, 16 LAW & POL'Y 63, 83-
84 (1994)). This study found that "fewer than one-fifth of employers with poor compliance
records, averaging five or more repeat orders per inspection, were punished," causing the
author to conclude "that the limited use of penalties is the result of institutionalized tolerance
of widespread violations, rather than the result of the vast majority of firms being good
apples." Id. at 723 n.40 (citing Brown, supra, at 83-84).
102Id. at 722-23 ("Another empirical study which compared compliance in the pulp and
paper industries in Canada and the United States found lower compliance rates in Canada,
which the author attributed to the fact that Canadian enforcers were more lenient than their
American counterparts when addressing noncompliance. An Australian analyst came to a
similar conclusion based on his observations of efforts to enforce mine safety and health in
Australia." (footnote omitted) (first citing Kathryn Harrison, Is Cooperation the Answer?
Canadian Environmental Enforcement in Comparative Context, 14 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 221, 240 (1995); and then citing NELL GUNNTNGHAM, SAFEGUARDING THE WORKER
272 (1984))).
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comprehensive federal law governing the treatment of animals, the Animal
Welfare Act.
1II. THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT
A. The A WA's Purposes and Scope
The Animal Welfare Act1 03 is the most comprehensive U.S. law governing
the treatment of animals. Under the Act, Animal Care, a subdivision of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS), regulates the treatment of more than 2.5 million animalsl04 held at
nearly 11,000 sites.105
The Act has three stated purposes:
(1) to insure that animals intended for use in research facilities or for
exhibition purposes or for use as pets are provided humane care and
treatment;
(2) to assure the humane treatment of animals during transportation in
commerce; and
(3) to protect the owners of animals from the theft of their animals by
preventing the sale or use of animals which have been stolen.1 06
Originally enacted as the Laboratory Animal Welfare Act in 1966, the Act
initially focused on the supply and treatment of dogs, cats, nonhuman primates,
guinea pigs, hamsters, and rabbits used for research.' 0 7 Congress subsequently
expanded the scope of the Act to cover additional commercial activities and
categories of animals. Today, the AWA regulates warm-blooded animals-with
some significant exceptions-when they are used for research, exhibition, or the
wholesale pet trade, and when they are transported in connection with these
activities. 0 8
Certain activities that would otherwise fall within the law's scope are
exempted, as are certain categories of animals. One significant exemption is the
1037 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159(2012).
104 See supra note 14.
105 See supra note 17.
106 7 U.S.C. § 2131.
1 07 Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (1966).
1087 U.S.C. § 2131. Notably not covered by the AWA are animals raised for food. See
id; see also id § 2132(g) ("The term 'animal' . . . excludes ... farm animals, such as, but
not limited to livestock or poultry, used or intended for use as food or fiber, or livestock or
poultry used or intended for use for improving animal nutrition, breeding, management, or
production efficiency, or for improving the quality of food or fiber."). The fact that these
animals are not covered by the AWA-or any other federal statute during the bulk of their
lives-has been the subject of criticism. See, e.g., David J. Wolfson & Mariann Sullivan,
Foxes in the Hen House: Animals, Agribusiness, and the Law: A Modern American Fable,
in ANIMAL RIGHTS 205,207-08 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004).
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exclusion of rats, mice, and birds when they are bred for research,1 09 even
though (or, perhaps more likely, precisely because) these animals comprise the
vast majority of warm-blooded animals used for research) 10 In addition, while
the USDA acknowledges that birds are intended to be covered by the Act when
used for regulated purposes, except when they are bred for research,1 ' the
agency has never actually regulated birds.1 12 Other exemptions exclude horses
except when used for research purposes; 113 "[s]tate and count[]y fairs, livestock
shows, rodeos, purebred dog and cat shows, and any other fairs or exhibitions
intended to advance agricultural arts and sciences";1 14 and animal dealers and
exhibitors whose business size has been deemed de minimis.11 5
B. A WA Standards, Certification, and Inspections
The Animal Welfare Act requires compliance with minimum animal
welfare standards. Entities engaged in activities covered by the AWA are
required to become certified by the USDA and to submit to unannounced
inspections intended to assess for compliance with these standards.
1. Animal Welfare Standards
The AWA directs the USDA to promulgate "minimum requirements:"
for handling, housing, feeding, watering, sanitation, ventilation, shelter from
extremes of weather and temperatures, adequate veterinary care, and separation
109 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) ("The term 'animal' . . . excludes ... birds, rats of the genus
Rattus, and mice of the genus Mus, bred for use in research . . . ."). Congress enacted this
exception in 2002, Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171,
§ 10301, 116 Stat. 134, 491, following years of litigation and a settlement agreement in
which the USDA had agreed to regulate rats, mice, and birds. See Stipulation of Dismissal
at 1, Alts. Research & Dev. Found. v. Glickman, 101 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2000) (No.
Civ.A. 99-581).
110 97% of research in the United Kingdom and 93% in the European Union is performed
on mice, rats, birds, and fish, species which are not regulated in the United States under the
AWA. USDA Publishes 2016 Animal Research Statistics - 7% Rise in Animal Use, SPEAKING
RESEARCH, https://speakingofresearch.com/2017/06/19/usda-publishes-2016-animal-research-
statistics-7-rise-in-animal-use/ [https//perma.cc/S997-KW9D].
Ill See Animal Welfare; Definition of Animal, 69 Fed. Reg. 31,513 (June 4, 2004).
112 See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 797 F.3d
1087, 1091-95 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Am. Anti-
Vivisection Soc'y v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. 2:18-cv-01753-PD (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2018).
113 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g).
1 1 4 1d § 2132(h). Although not mentioned in the statute, the USDA has also exempted
dog races by regulation. 9 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2017).
115 7 U.S.C. § 2133; see also id. § 2132(h) ("The term 'exhibitor' . . . excludes. . . an
owner of a common, domesticated household pet who derives less than a substantial portion
of income from a nonprimary source (as determined by the Secretary) for exhibiting an
animal that exclusively resides at the residence of the pet owner .... .").
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by species where the Secretary finds necessary for humane handling, care, or
treatment of animals; ... for exercise of dogs, as determined by an attending
veterinarian in accordance with general standards promulgated by the
Secretary, ... for a physical environment adequate to promote the
psychological well-being of primates,11 6
and for "the handling, care, and treatment" of animals being transported in
commerce.11 7 These regulatory standards are set forth at 9 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-
3.142.118 The vast majority of animals are governed by what are referred to as
"generic" standards,1 1 9 while cats, dogs, guinea pigs, hamsters, marine
mammals, primates, and rabbits are each governed by somewhat more specific
standards.1 20
The Act also calls for additional regulatory requirements for animals used
for research, including requirements intended to ensure that "alternatives to any
procedure likely to produce pain to or distress in an experimental animal" are
considered; to limit the use of animals in "more than one major operative
experiment"; and, in the case of procedures "likely to produce pain to or distress
in an experimental animal," to govern veterinary consultation, "the use of
tranquilizers, analgesics, and anesthetics," "pre-surgical and post-surgical care,"
"the use of paralytics without anesthesia," and the "withholding of tranquilizers,
anesthesia, analgesia, or euthanasia."1 2 1 Relatedly, the Act requires each
research facility to form a committee, usually referred to as an institutional
animal care and use committee, that is responsible for conducting inspections to
ensure compliance with these research requirements. 122 The regulatory
standards governing these research requirements and the committees tasked
with overseeing them are set forth at 9 C.F.R. § 2.31.
The USDA stresses that the standards under the Act are the bare minimum
and "encourage[s]" regulated entities "to exceed these standards."l 23
2. Certification Under the A WA
The Animal Welfare Act's primary mechanisms are a licensing/registration
(collectively, "certification") and inspection regime. Anyone who wants to deal
116 1d § 2143(a)(2).
11 7 1d § 2143(a)(4).118 A few of the statutorily required minimum standards also appear in 9 C.F.R. part 2.
See, e.g, 9 C.F.R. § 2.40 (setting forth minimum standards for veterinary care).
1 19 See id §§ 3.125-3.142 (setting forth "Specifications for the Humane Handling, Care,
Treatment, and Transportation of Warmblooded Animals Other than Dogs, Cats, Rabbits,
Hamsters, Guinea Pigs, Nonhuman Primates, and Marine Mammals").12 0 See id § § 3.1-3.118.
121 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3).
12 2 1d § 2143(b).
1 2 3 ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL CARE
FACTSHEET: THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT (2012); see also JAMES F. GESUALDI, EXCELLENCE
BEYOND COMPLIANCE (2014).
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in or exhibit regulated animals must obtain a license, 124 while anyone who wants
to engage in animal research, as well as commercial carriers that transport
animals, must register their business with the USDA. 125
Under the AWA, applicants for an initial license must be inspected by the
agency and, during that inspection, must demonstrate compliance with the
minimum regulatory standards discussed above. 126 Licenses expire after one
year, and currently the agency does not inspect prior to renewal or withhold
renewal based on violations of the standards, a practice that has faced
considerable criticism, including from the USDA's own Office of Inspector
General (OIG).127 Registered facilities must renew their registration every three
years.1 28 The agency currently does not inspect facilities before registering
them, even for the first time,1 29 a practice that the OIG has also criticized.1 30
124 7 U.S.C. § 2133. An animal dealer is defined as
any person who, in commerce, for compensation or profit, delivers for transportation,
or transports, except as a carrier, buys, or sells, or negotiates the purchase or sale of, (1)
any dog or other animal whether alive or dead for research, teaching, exhibition, or use
as a pet, or (2) any dog for hunting, security, or breeding purposes.
Id § 2132(f).
1 2 51d § 2136. The differential treatment of research facilities is rooted in concerns about
interference with scientific research. "Carrier" is defined as "the operator of any airline,
railroad, motor carrier, shipping line, or other enterprise, which is engaged in the business of
transporting any animals for hire." Id § 2132(j).
12 6 1d § 2133; 9 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.11 (2017). License applicants are given three
opportunities to demonstrate compliance, after which they must wait six months before
reapplying. Id § 2.3(b).
12 7 See generally Delcianna J. Winders, Administrative License Renewal ahd Due
Process-A Case Study, FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018-2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract-2952062 [https://permacc/DL94-8VN5] (describing criticisms and
urging that the agency condition renewal on compliance); see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AUDIT REPORT No. 33002-0001-CH, ANIMAL AND PLANT
HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE - IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT 11 (Mar.
1992) [hereinafter 1992 OIG AUDIT REPORT] (stating that USDA's failure to "require that
facilities be in compliance with the act to obtain license renewals" results in "reduced
assurance that animal care facilities will make required corrections to comply with the
provisions of the act to ensure the humane care and treatment of animals"); id at 14 ("APHIS
should ensure that dealer facilities are in compliance with the intent of the Animal Welfare
Act through the use of compliance inspections prior to the renewal of licenses.").12 8 9 C.F.R. § 2.25(a).
129 See id (requiring only completing and filing a form to register).
130 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AUDIT REPORT No. 33600-1-CH,
ANIMAL AND PLANT INSPECTION SERVICE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT 15
(Jan. 1995) [hereinafter 1995 OIG AUDIT REPORT] ("Although not specifically required by
the regulations, pre-registration inspections are the only reliable means at APHIS' disposal
to ensure that the facilities which it registers are operating in compliance with the provisions
of the Act. Because a newly registered facility may not be inspected for up to a year, the
Department could be subject to adverse publicity if serious violations by such a facility
become public knowledge."). The OIG has urged USDA to "[r]equire that inspections be
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The USDA provides initial license applicants and registrants with a copy of
the AWA regulations and standards, and requires that they "acknowledge
receipt of" and "agree to comply with" the regulations and standards by signing
a form.131 License renewal applicants are also required to certify compliance
but are provided with another copy of the standards and regulations only on
request. 132
Once licensed or registered, regulated facilities are subject to unannounced
inspections to assess for compliance with the standards.1 33
3. AWA Inspections
Animal Care employs approximately 100 inspectors 34 to inspect more than
2.5 million animalsl 35 at nearly 11,000 regulated sites. 136 The AWA mandates
that research facilities be inspected at least annually, 137 but sets no inspection
frequency for other types of regulated facilities. The agency uses what is
referred to in the literature as regulator "targeting"l 38 and what it calls a "risk-
performed at all animal research and handling facilities prior to registration, and that
registrations be withheld from any facility which is not in compliance." Id131 9 C.F.R. § 2.2(a) (licensing); id § 2.26 (registration).
1 32 1d § 2.2(b).
1337 U.S.C. § 2146(a) (2012) ("The Secretary shall make such investigations or
inspections as he deems necessary to determine whether any dealer, exhibitor, intermediate
handler, carrier, research facility, or operator of an auction sale subject to section 2142 of
this title, has violated or is violating any provision of this chapter or any regulation or
standard issued thereunder, and for such purposes, the Secretary shall, at all reasonable times,
have access to the places of business and the facilities, animals, and those records required
to be kept pursuant to section 2140 of this title of any such dealer, exhibitor, intermediate
handler, carrier, research facility, or operator of an auction sale."). These inspections are
unannounced. See Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., Animal Welfare Act Inspections,
U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., https/Avww.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalwelfare/sa awa/ct awa
inspections [https://perma.cc/V4QK-VX3K] (last modified Nov. 13, 2017); OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AUDIT REPORT NO. 33601-000141, ANIMAL AND
PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE OVERSIGHT OF RESEARCH FACILITIES 1 (Dec. 2014)
[hereinafter 2014 OIG AUDIT REPORT], https://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/33601-0001-41.pdf
[httpsi//perma.cc/Q6E7-7PWP]; ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRIC., ANIMAL CARE FACTSHEET: COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS 1 (2012) [hereinafter
FACTSHEET: COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS], https-//www.aphis.usdagov/publications/animal
welfare/content/printableversion/fscomplianceimpection.pdf[https//permac/W9YC-9EUG].
134 E-mail from Kay Carter-Corker, Assistant Deputy Adm'r, Animal Care, Animal &
Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., to Howard Baskin, Advisory Bd.
Chairman, Big Cat Rescue (Oct. 31, 2016, 4:19 PM) (on file with Ohio State Law Journal)
(104 total inspectors); see also 2014 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 133, at 5 (125 inspectors
in fiscal year 2010).
135 2018 EXPLANATORY NOTES, supra note 15, at 20-139.
136Id at 2049.
1377 U.S.C. § 2146(a).
1 38 See Faure, supra note 59, at 329-30 (discussing targeting and its effectiveness).
476 [Vol. 79:3
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W ENFORCEMENT
based inspection system" to determine inspection frequencies.1 39 Under this
system, facilities that are "consistently in compliance" are inspected less
frequently-once every two to three years-while "problem facilities" are
inspected more frequently-as often as every three months.1 40 In addition, if an
inspection reveals violationsl 4 1 "that have, or are likely to have, a serious impact
on the well-being of the animals," inspectors are required to reinspect within
forty-five days.1 4 2 These reinspections typically focus only on the prior
citation(s) impacting animal welfare and are accordingly referred to as
"focused" inspections. 143 The USDA also accepts complaints from the public
and will inspect "in response to legitimate concerns and complaints."'4
An inspection report is generated for every AWA inspection 4 5 and, until
recently, after a twenty-one-day appeal window, 146 was made available online
with minimal redactions in a public, searchable database, where it remained for
a three-year period.1 47 The inspection report contains a summary of any
139 See Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., supra note 133; see also Animal & Plant
Health Inspection Serv., Risk Based Inspection System, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC.,
https//www.aphis.usdagov/aphis/ourfocus/animalwelfare/sa awa/ct awa risk based inspection
system [https//perma.cc/9FQB-835A] (last modified Aug. 15, 2016).
140 Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., supra note 139; see also 2015
EXPLANATORY NOTES, supra note 16, at 20-50 (calling for facilities that have been flagged
as high-risk that are cited for repeat violations to be reinspected within ninety days).
141 "APHIS synonymously used the terms violations, alleged violations, and
noncompliant items in its documents." OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
AUDrr REPORT NO. 33002-4-SF, ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE ANIMAL
CARE PROGRAM INSPECTIONS OF PROBLEMATIC DEALERS 1 n.5 (May 2010) [hereinafter 2010
OIG AUDrr REPORT], https-//www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/33002-4-SF.pdflhttps-//perma.ce/B 3P 3
-AM68].
142 Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., supra note 139. However, according to the
most recent available data from the agency, only 61% of repeat violators are reinspected
within the prescribed time frame. Response to APHIS FOIA Request No. 11-152 (Mar. 8,
2011) (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
1 4 3 See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL WELFARE INSPECTION GUIDE 3-22 (2013)
[hereinafter ANIMAL WELFARE INSPECTION GUIDE], https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal-welfa
re/downloads/Animal-Care-Inspection-Guide.pdf [https/perma.cc/CYH6-4ZPJ].
144 Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., supra note 133.
14 5 See, e.g., FACTSHEET: COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS, supra note 133 ("Once the
inspection is completed, the inspector documents any noncompliant items or issues that
require correction in an inspection report and takes photographs as needed.").
14 6 ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL CARE
TECH NOTE: INSPECTION REPORT APPEALS PROCESS 1-2 (June 2017), https://www.aphis.usda.
gov/publications/animalwelfare/2017/AC-Tech-Note-Inspection-Report-Appeals-Process.pdf
[https//perma.cc/DQ46-5L24].
14 7 See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. Even before the website blackout,
under a recently implemented policy referred to as "Teachable Moments," not all
noncompliant items were included on inspection reports. See E-mail Bulletin from U.S.
Dep't of Agric., USDA Animal Care Revises Its Animal Welfare Inspection Guide (Jan. 14,
2016), https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDAAPHIS/bulletins/13 0 44 a6
[https-//perma.cc/ADX6-32AP]. Noncompliant items that meet certain criteria were instead
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noncompliant items, also referred to by the agency as violations or citations,
including the number of animals impacted, sorted by the regulatory provision at
issue.148 A correction deadline is also generally included for each item on the
report.1 49
The inspection report is also supposed to specifically note any "direct,"
"critical," or "repeat" violations. 50 "Direct" noncompliant items are those that
"at the time of the inspection" are "having a serious or severe adverse effect on
the health and well-being of the animal, or ha[ve] the high potential to have that
effect in the immediate future."15 1 For example, as explained in the AWA
deemed "teachable moments" and noted on a separate "Teachable Moments worksheet" that
is not part of the inspection report and not readily available to the public. Id "A teachable
moment is a minor non-compliant item that: 1) the facility is willing and able to correct
quickly; 2) is not impacting the welfare of any animal(s); and 3) has not previously been
cited." Id This policy was reportedly announced at a meeting with dog breeders, by USDA
officials who explained that the USDA needs "to enable breeders to sell their dogs to pet
stores" and suggested that violations are "an impediment to such sales." PA Dog Law Board
Member Hired by USDA, UNITED AGAINST PUPPY MILLS (Oct. 4, 2016),
https//unitedagahistpuppymills.org/2016/10/04/pa-dog-law-board-member-ied-usda/ [https//per
ma.cc/V2C2-JXG6]. The USDA Office of Inspector General has noted that Teachable
Moments are being "used inconsistently" and not properly documented. OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AUDIT REPORT No. 33601-0001-31, APHIS:
ANIMAL WELFARE ACT - MARINE MAMMALS (CETACEANS) 10-12 (May 2017) [hereinafter
2017 OIG AUDIT REPORT], https//www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/
33601-0001-31.pdf[https://perma.cc/Q6E7-7PWP].
14 8 ANIMAL WELFARE INSPECTION GUIDE, supra note 143, at 2-7 to 2-8.
149Id; see also ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERv., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
ANIMAL CARE FACTSHEET: ANIMAL ExIBIroRs 2 (2012),
https//www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal welfare/content/printable version/fs anexhit.
pdf [https://perma.cc/ECB4-N4S5] ("If an inspection reveals deficiencies in complying with
the AWA standards and regulations, the APHIS official documents the deficiencies and gives
the facility a timeframe for correction. This timeframe is determined by the severity of the
infraction and the direct risks to the animals' health and well-being."); FACTSHEET:
COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS, supra note 133 ("For each issue that requires correction, the
specific applicable regulation is cited, along with a description of the problem and a deadline
by which the issue must be corrected."). As noted above, reinspections are required within
forty-five days for serious violations. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. For other
violations, despite the assignment of a correction date, reinspection is not required. In
addition, for repeat violations that previously received a correct-by date yet persist, a new
correct-by date is not assigned.
1 5 0 ANIMAL WELFARE INSPECTION GUIDE, supra note 143, at 2-7 to 2-8; see also id. at
2-9 to 2-10 (noting critical noncompliant items are violations that resulted in serious or
severe adverse effect on an animal, but occurred in the past and also include falsification of
records, refusal to permit inspection, and interfering with, harassing, or threatening an
APHIS official). A 2010 audit by the USDA Office of Inspector General found that nearly
one in three inspectors failed to "correctly report all repeat or direct violations." 2010 OIG
AUDIT REPORT, supra note 141, at 2; see also id at 21-23 (providing examples). The audit
also found that "inspectors did not always document violations with sufficient evidence." Id
at 17.
151 ANIMAL WELFARE INSPECTION GUIDE, supra note 143, at 2-10.
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inspection guide used by inspectors, a heavy flea or tick infestation would be a
"direct" violation, as would use of tranquilizers on an animal to facilitate public
handling.1 52 "Critical" violations include direct violations as well as "prior
adverse event[s] that had serious or severe animal welfare consequences to one
or more animals, but pose[] no current risks to the animals," and, inter alia,
chronic unavailability for inspections, falsification of records, and interfering
with, harassing, or threatening an APHIS official. 153 Repeat noncompliances are
two sequential violations of the same regulatory subsection.1 54 They need not
involve the same animal(s) to qualify as repeats.
Notably, a recent USDA Office of Inspector General audit found that AWA
"inspections are not always performed consistently" and that, as a result,
"APHIS may not be able to provide assurance that those exhibitors subject to
inspection are in compliance with all requirements of AWA."' 55
C. A WA Enforcement
1. Statutory Provisions Pertaining to Enforcement
The penalties available under the AWA depend on the type of facility at
issue. For violations by a research facility, the AWA allows for civil monetary
penalties of up to $11,390 per violation, as well as cease-and-desist orders. 156
All other regulated entities are subject to these penalties in addition to license
suspension or revocation. 157 For any statutory penalty, with the exception of a
temporary license suspension of twenty-one days or fewer, the AWA provides
152Id at B-2; see also id at B-2 to B-5 (providing additional examples as guidance for
inspectors).
153 Id at 2-9 to 2-10.
154Id at 2-8. "The 'Repeat' designation may be also be used if the section and subsection
have been cited as a Repeat citation multiple times within the last 3 years, even if it was not
cited on the last full inspection." Id; see also 2010 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 141, at
9 ("AC narrowly defines a repeat violator as one that consecutively violates the same
subsection of the animal welfare regulations. This means that on successive inspections a
dealer can violate different sections of the regulations without being labeled a repeat violator
and, therefore, the inspector is not required to recommend an enforcement action.").
155 2017 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 147, at 9-10.
156 7 U.S.C. § 2149(b) (2012); 7 C.F.R. § 3.91(b)(2)(ii) (2017) (adjusting for inflation);
Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustment for 2018, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,129, 11,132 (Mar.
14, 2018) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 3). Failure to comply with a cease and desist order
is subject to a penalty of $1708, id, "for each offense, and each day during which such failure
continues shall be deemed a separate offense," 7 C.F.R. § 3.91(b)(2)(ii). As is standard, civil
penalty monies go to the general Treasury, not to the agency. See Nyborg & Telle, supra
note 28, at 2809 ("To our knowledge, it is uncommon that regulatory agencies can add
collected penalties to their own budgets . . . .").
1577 U.S.C. § 2149(a). As noted above, research facilities are treated differently out of
concerns with interfering with research. See supra note 125 and the accompanying text.
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for a right to a notice and hearing.' 58 Although not required by law, 159 the
USDA currently provides for a full, on-the-record hearing in all cases, 160 a
practice that the agency's Office of Inspector General has criticized as causing
undue delays.161
The AWA gives the USDA the authority to "compromise" any civil
penalty 62 and instructs the agency to "give due consideration to the
appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the size of the business of the
person involved, the gravity of the violation, the person's good faith, 63 and the
history of previous violations" when calculating monetary penalties.4
Criminal penalties are also available under the AWA for dealers, exhibitors,
and auction operators,1 65 but are exceedingly rare in practice.1 66 In addition, the
Act requires the USDA to refer matters to the Attorney General for injunctive
relief where animal welfare violations are "placing the health of any animal in
1587 U.S.C. § 2149(a) (requiring notice and hearing for longer license suspension or
revocation); id § 2149(b) ("No penalty shall be assessed or cease and desist order issued
unless such person is given notice and opportunity for a hearing with respect to the alleged
violation, and the order of the Secretary assessing a penalty and making a cease and desist
order shall be final and conclusive unless the affected person files an appeal from the
Secretary's order with the appropriate United States Court of Appeals.").
1 59 See generally Winders, supra note 127, at 9-13 (reviewing hearing requirements
under the Administrative Procedure Act).
1 6 0 See 9 C.F.R. § 4.1 (2017) (stating that the Department Rules of Practice apply to all
AWA proceedings); 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.130-1.151 (setting forth those rules).
161 The OIG has noted that the use of "court hearings to apply civil penalties" results "in
an excessive period of time to assess civil penalties." 1992 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note
127, at 11, 13.; see also id. at 15 (finding that reliance on Administrative Law Judge system
results in excessive time to remove problematic facilities from the program). In 1992, the
OIG suggested: "APHIS should implement procedures which would allow for hearing cases
outside the Administrative Law Judge system. Therefore, APHIS should request from the
Secretary of Agriculture a waiver from the requirements of the Department Rules of Practice
for facilities continuously violating the Animal Welfare Act." Id. at 15. For further discussion
of these issues, see Winders, supra note 127, at 40-41.
1627 U.S.C. § 2149(b).
16 3 
"Good faith includes a person who has animals that are in good health and do not
suffer as a result of the violations, and cooperates with IES and AC." 2014 OIG AUDIT
REPORT, supra note 133, at 17 n.38.
164 7 U.S.C. § 2149(b).16 5 1d. § 2149(d).
166 There were five criminal AWA cases in 2017; all of them focused on animal fighting
rather than the regulatory provisions discussed in this article. Animal Welfare, U.S. DEP'T
JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/enrd/animal-welfare [https://perma.cc/9NWZ-AA48].
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serious danger" or where an entity "is dealing in stolen animals," 67 but it
appears that this provision has never been utilized. 168
2. A WA Enforcement Practices
When Animal Care determines that noncompliant items documented during
an inspection warrant further action, it has a number of options, including
issuing a warning, entering into a settlement agreement, or seeking formal
enforcement by initiating a hearing.
a. Warnings
For less serious violations, Animal Care may issue a letter of warning. 169
According to USDA enforcement policies, a warning may be issued if an entity
is still out of compliance after a ninety-day reinspection, has accrued multiple
repeat citations, is making slow progress toward compliance, or has been cited
for a direct violation that has "no obvious effects on animal health or
1677 U.S.C. § 2159(a) ("Whenever the Secretary has reason to believe that any dealer,
carrier, exhibitor, or intermediate handler is dealing in stolen animals, or is placing the health
of any animal in serious danger in violation of this chapter or the regulations or standards
promulgated thereunder, the Secretary shall notify the Attorney General, who may apply to
the United States district court in which such dealer, carrier, exhibitor, or intermediate
handler resides or conducts business for a temporary restraining order or injunction to
prevent any such person from operating in violation of this chapter or the regulations and
standards prescribed under this chapter.").
168A response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) for such referrals yielded a response that "no records responsive
to your request were located." Letter from Vanessa R. Brinkmann, Senior Counsel, Office
of Info. Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to author (Nov. 17, 2016) [hereinafter Letter from
Vanessa R. Brinkman to author] (on file with Ohio State Law Journal). The author is still
awaiting a response to a similar request submitted to the USDA on July 8, 2016.
1692015 ExPLANATORY NOTES, supra note 16, at 20-50; see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AUDIT REPORT No. 33002-3-SF, APHIS ANIMAL CARE
PROGRAM INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 2 (Sept. 2005) [hereinafter 2005 OIG
AUDIT REPORT]. In addition to warning letters, the agency also uses an even more light-
handed alternative, a "Letter of Information." See 2010 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 141,
at 5 & n.12 (describing a "letter of information" as "an informal warning letter" and noting
that "[iun 2007, AC discontinued 'letter of information' as an enforcement option").
Although the agency has indicated that letters of information were discontinued, this appears
to be false, as an FOIA request for such letters submitted by the author to the USDA yielded
more than 200 pages of such letters that were sent between 2013 and 2016. See Response to
APHIS FOIA Request No. 15-05453 (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (containing
letters of information sent by Animal Care); see also Response to APHIS FOIA Request
Regarding Teachable Moments, at 71 (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (containing
materials related to the development and dissemination of Teachable Moments guidance)
(noting, as part of a Q&A document, that "[o]ther actions the Agency may take in lieu of
fines/suspensions/revocations include the issuance of letters of information and/or Formal
Warning Notices").
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welfare."1 70 USDA policy also dictates that "an official warning can be sent if
no other enforcement action"-including a warning-"was taken against the
violator in the previous 3 years."'71 As the example of the dog breeder Souza
discussed in the introduction to this Article evinces, and as further discussed
below, the agency does not appear to adhere to this policy strictly, if at all.1 72
The USDA considers warnings to be an "immediate deterrent,"17 3 and states
that issuance of a warning "allows APHIS to address infractions in a timely
manner, and facilities to improve their overall compliance before further action
is necessary." 1 74 These assertions by the agency are interrogated later in this
Article.1 75
Warnings are typically sent to the regulated entity by certified mail. The
warning, also referred to as a 7060, for the agency form number, is labeled
"OFFICIAL WARNING VIOLATION OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS," and
states, "The U.S. Department of Agriculture has evidence that on or about
[specified date(s)], you or your organization committed violations of the
following sections of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 9."176 The warning
then provides a brief description of the violation(s), including the date(s), and
regulatory provision(s) violated.1 7 7 Sometimes no specific facts about the
17 0 ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV.: ANIMAL CARE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
CHECKLIST FOR ANIMAL CARE INSPECTION REPORT 12,
https//www.aphis.usda.gov/ani welfare/downloads/Inspecion_RequirementsAttachments.P
DF [https-//permacc/86UT-NUKB].
1712010 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 141, at 13 (citing to "Animal Care Enforcement
Action Guidance for Inspection Reports distributed to [Animal Care] staff in 2007'); see also
ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV.: ANIMAL CARE, supra note 170, at 12 (stating
that a warning is only appropriate where there have been no enforcement actions other than
a ninety-day re-inspection in the preceding three years). Repeated attempts to clarify with
the agency whether this policy is in effect, given the failure to adhere to it, went unanswered.
See E-mails from Delcianna J. Winders, Academic Fellow, Animal Law & Policy Program,
Harvard Law School, to Sarah Conant, Dir. of Enf't, Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv.
(Apr. 19, 2016, Apr. 25, 2016, May 3, 2016, May 10, 2016) (on file with Ohio State Law
Journal). An FOIA request pertaining to this matter also failed to illuminate the issue.
Request from Delcianna Winders, FOIA Request No. 2016-APHIS-02112-F (Feb. 4, 2016)
(requesting "[a] copy of the Animal Care Enforcement Action Guidance for Inspection
Reports ... as well as any similar subsequent guidance documents that may have been
issued").
17 2 See infra Part IV.
173 2015 EXPLANATORY NOTES, supra note 16, at 20-50; see also Andrew D. Cardon et
al., Understanding USDA's Enforcement Process, 42 LAB ANIMAL 13, 13 (2013) ("[A]n
Official Warning Letter ... may be issued with or without an investigation by IES.").
174 2015 EXPLANATORY NOTES, supra note 16, at 20-108.
1 7 5 See infra Parts IV-V.
176 See, e.g., Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., supra note 2 (official warning
from USDA-APHIS to Josh L. Souza); Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., supra note
4 (official warning from USDA-APHIS to Josh L. Souza).
1 77 See, e.g., Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., supra note 2 (official warning
from USDA-APHIS to Josh L. Souza); Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., supra note
4 (official warning from USDA-APHIS to Josh L. Souza).
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particular violation(s) are provided, but a brief description can typically be
found by cross-referencing the inspection report(s) for the date(s) referenced on
the warning. Toward the bottom of the form, in small font, it states "Any further
violation of these federal regulations may result in the assessment of a civil
penalty, criminal prosecution, or other sanctions."178
The USDA sends a cover letter with a warning that includes the statement,
"This notice is being issued at this time as a serious warning that if you fail to
comply with the requirements of the AWA in the future, this citation and all past
and future documented violations will be used to justify a more severe
penalty." 179 The letter notes the maximum monetary penalty per violation.180
AWA warnings do not require a response, and their prior issuance is not held
against a licensee in any subsequent enforcement actions. 181
Violations that the USDA deems too serious to qualify for a warning are
referred to APHIS's Investigative and Enforcement Service (IES).1 82 After
conducting an investigation, if IES decides to pursue enforcement, it may
ultimately decide to issue an official warning, offer the violator a settlement
agreement, or refer the case to the USDA Office of General Counsel (OGC) to
be considered for more formal action.183 The USDA acknowledges that fines
are "very rare."1 84
b. Settlement Agreements
Settlement agreements typically focus on monetary penalties, and "APHIS
typically offers to settle for a civil penalty that is much lower than the maximum
civil penalty authorized in the relevant statute."185 The USDA's Office of
178 See, e.g., Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., supra note 2 (official warning
from USDA-APHIS to Josh L. Souza); Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., supra note
4 (official warning from USDA APHIS to Josh L. Souza).
179 See, e.g., Letter from Gerald Rushin, Assistant Deputy Adm'r, Animal Care, Animal
& Plant Health Inspection Serv., to Living Treasures II, Inc. (Mar. 17, 2016) (on file with
Ohio State Law Journal).
180 As of 2011, however, the agency was citing the wrong amount, failing to account for
a 2008 statutory increase in the maximum penalty from $2,500 to $10,000. Food,
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 14214, 122 Stat. 1651, 2228
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2149(b) (2012)); see, e.g., Letter from U.S. Dep't of Agric. Animal
& Plant Health Inspection Serv. to S. Glenice Viken, S G Kennels (Mar. 22, 2011). This
problem seems to have been corrected by 2014.
181 See 2014 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 133, at 24 n.56 ("[V]iolations cited in a
previous inspection report or Official Warnings issued for violations are not considered as
prior history.").
182 2005 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 169, at 2.
183 2014 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 133, at 1-2.
184 Response to APHIS FOIA Request Regarding Teachable Moments, supra note 169,
at 70.
185 Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., JES Frequently Asked Questions, U.S.
DEP'T AGRIC., https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/business-services/ies/iesfaq
[https://perma.ccGG9J-TBC9] (last modified May 24, 2017).
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Inspector General has repeatedly criticized the agency for discounting stipulated
penalties so steeply that they are treated as a "cost of doing business" by the
regulated community.1 86
Settlement discounts are calculated using a penalty worksheet that provides
for discounts based on the statutorily delineated penalty factors ("size of the
business of the person involved, the gravity of the violation, the person's good
faith, and the history of previous violations"1 87). Beyond the fact that these four
factors are weighed, "the penalty assessment process is wholly unknown" to the
public. 88 The USDA has insisted on keeping the penalty worksheets secret on
I 86 See 2014 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 133, at prefatory note (What OIG Found)
("IES issued penalties that were reduced by an average of 86[%] from Animal Welfare Act's
(AWA) authorized maximum penalty per violation [and] under-assessed penalties ... by
granting good-faith reductions without merit or using a smaller number of violations than
the actual number."); id at 18 & n.41 ("In three prior OIG audits, we reported that IES'
enforcement of AWA was ineffective and the penalty worksheet calculated minimal
penalties that did not deter violators."); id. at 3 & n.8 ("In 1995, an Office of Inspector
General (OIG) audit of APHIS' enforcement policies found that APHIS did not fully address
problems disclosed in a prior report, and that APHIS needed to take stronger enforcement
actions to correct serious or repeat violations of AWA. Dealers and other facilities had little
incentive to comply with AWA because monetary penalties were, in some cases, arbitrarily
reduced and often so low that violators regarded them as a cost of doing business." (footnote
omitted) (citing 1995 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 130)); id at 3 & n.9 ("In 2005, OIG
performed an audit on animals in research facilities and found that APHIS was not
aggressively pursuing enforcement actions against violators of AWA and was assessing
minimal monetary penalties. Inspectors believed the lack of enforcement action undermined
their credibility and authority to enforce AWA. In addition to reducing the penalty by 75 [%],
APHIS offered other concessions-making penalties basically meaningless. Violators
continued to consider the monetary stipulation as a normal cost of business, rather than a
deterrent for violating the law." (footnote omitted) (citing 2005 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra
note 169)); id at 3 & n.10 ("In 2010, an OIG audit of problematic dealers found that APHIS'
enforcement process was ineffective, and the agency was misusing its own guidelines to
lower penalties for AWA violators. The agency relied on education to improve dealer
compliance, but did not implement an appropriate level of enforcement. At a time when
Congress [quadrupled] the authorized maximum penalty to strengthen fines for violations,
actual penalties were 20[%] less than previous calculations." (footnote omitted) (citing 2010
OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 141)).
187 7 U.S.C. § 2149(b) (2012).188 Letter from Kevin Shea, Adm'r, Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't
of Agric., to Andrew D. Cardon, Dir. of State & Legal Affairs, Nat'l Ass'n for Biomedical
Research (June 30, 2014) [hereinafter Letter from Kevin Shea to Andrew D. Cardon] (on file
with Ohio State Law Journal). Some information about the penalty worksheets has been
disclosed through inspector general audit reports, though this information may no longer be
current as the penalty worksheets have since been revised. For example, according to the
December 2014 audit report:
A settlement adjustment reduces penalties by 75[%] as an incentive for violators to forgo
their right to a hearing, thereby saving the agency the associated costs. The discretionary
reduction allows IES to recommend an upward or downward change in the penalty up
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the grounds that disclosure would "result in a grave risk of circumvention of the
AWA" by "allow[ing] licensees to calculate the cost of doing business with
certain AWA violations and to circumvent penalty assessment." 189 Legislation
was previously introduced to require disclosure of the AWA penalty worksheets
but went nowhere. 190
The USDA's OIG has repeatedly found problems with the agency's penalty
worksheets, concluding that they calculate penalties that are too low to have a
deterrent effect.1 91 In its 2014 audit, the OIG found that despite repeated
revisions to the penalty worksheet intended to better assess penalties, "total
monetary penalties were lower than those calculated by prior worksheets."l 92
Specifically, the OIG found that, in cases involving animal deaths and other
"egregious" violations, the USDA had issued penalties to violators that were
reduced by an average of 86% from AWA's authorized maximum penalty.1 93
Following this most recent audit the USDA agreed to again revise its penalty
worksheet, but stipulated penalty reductions appear to continue to be
exceedingly high.
The USDA has also faced criticism from the OIG for failing to collect
stipulated penalties.1 94 The AWA mandates that
Upon any failure to pay the penalty assessed by a final order under this section,
the Secretary shall request the Attorney General to institute a civil action in a
district court of the United States or other United States court for any district
to 30[%], if IES or AC believes that the monetary penalty calculated by the penalty
worksheet is not appropriate.
2014 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 133, at 17-18, 18 n.39. "Good faith may reduce the
total penalty by 25 [%]." Id at 24. "Criteria that constitute good faith include complying with
AWA and correcting violations, having animals that are in good health and do not suffer as
a result of the violations, and cooperating with APHIS." Id "Guidelines also state that a good
faith reduction must not be applied if the violator received a warning within the past 3 years."
Id at 25.
189 Letter from Kevin Shea to Andrew D. Cardon, supra note 188, at 3.
190 Enforcement Transparency Act of 2015, H.R. 3136, 114th Cong.
19 1 See 2014 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 133, at 18 ("In three prior 01G audits, we
reported that IES' enforcement of AWA was ineffective and the penalty worksheet
calculated minimal penalties that did not deter violators." (first citing 1995 OIG AUDIT
REPORT, supra note 130; then citing 2005 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 169; and then
citing 2010 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 141)).
1921d at 16.
193 Id
194 See 1995 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 130, at 18 ("APHIS did not always take
appropriate administrative action when violators of the Animal Welfare Act did not pay the
penalties established by stipulation agreements.. . . Unless APHIS is prepared to take
aggressive collection action against facilities who do not pay stipulations on a timely basis,
the effectiveness of stipulation agreements as an enforcement tool could be reduced."); see
also 2010 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 141, at 30-36 (detailing collection failures,
including failure to refer delinquent accounts to the Department of Treasury as required by
the Debt Collection Improvement Act).
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in which such person is found or resides or transacts business, to collect the
penalty, and such court shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide any such
action. 195
Such civil actions are virtually unheard of, and it appears that the USDA is not
referring uncollected penalties to the Attorney General as required by law. 196
Nonmonetary settlements are rare1 9 7 but do occur. Such settlement offers
typically involve an "alleged violator's agreement to specific terms that
generally involve abstaining from APHIS-regulated activities," such as agreeing
to license revocation and/or transfer of animals.1 98
c. Formal Administrative Proceedings
If IES refers a case to the OGC, the OGC may file a formal complaint with
an administrative law judge. 9 9 Although not required by statute, under current
USDA regulations the alleged violator is then given a full, on-the-record hearing
before an administrative law judge (ALJ).2 00
After conducting a hearing, the ALJ issues a decision. If he or she agrees
that violations have occurred, the decision will delineate the penalty, which can
include fines, cease-and-desist orders, and, in the case of entities other than
research facilities and carriers, license suspension or revocation. 2 0 1 An adverse
decision can be appealed to the USDA's Judicial Officer, and then to a U.S.
Court of Appeals.2 02
195 7 U.S.C. § 2149(b) (2012).
196 A response to an FOIA request submitted to the DOJ for such referrals yielded a
response that "no records responsive to your request were located." Letter from Vanessa R.
Brinkman to author, supra note 168. The author is still awaiting a response to a similar
request submitted to the USDA in June 2016.
197 For example, in calendar year 2011 there was only one such settlement.198 Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., supra note 185.
1 9 9 Of course, the OGC is not required to do so and in many cases it does not, even where
Investigative and Enforcement Services urges enforcement action. See Animal & Plant
Health Inspection Serv., Enforcement Glossary, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC.,
htts://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/business-services/
ies/ies_performancemetrics/iesenforcementglossary [https://perma.cc/8L5B-T6XQ] (last
modified May 4, 2017) ("After IES refers a case and supporting evidence to USDA's Office
of the General Counsel (OGC) with a request to institute an administrative proceeding, OGC
reviews the evidence to determine whether there is reason to believe a violation of an APHIS-
administered law has occurred. If so, OGC prepares an administrative complaint that it files
on behalf of APHIS to institute a formal adjudicatory administrative proceeding.").200 See supra notes 124, 156-57 and accompanying text.
201 Notably, despite APHIS's attempts to defend its severe penalty discounting by
claiming that penalties issued by administrative law judges are severely reduced, the OIG
has rejected this. 2014 OIG AuDIr REPORT, supra note 133, at 16-21.
2027 U.S.C. § 2149(c); 7 C.F.R. § 1.145 (2010).
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d. Judicial Enforcement
As noted above, although the AWA provides for referral to the Attorney
General for criminal penalties and injunctive relief, such actions are virtually
unheard of and the USDA appears to be violating the mandate that it refer to the
Attorney General cases involving violations that place the health of an animal
in serious danger or where an entity is dealing in stolen animals.203
Approximately five years ago, the USDA announced plans to partner with the
Department of Justice on AWA enforcement actions, but to date no specific
details of such a plan have been announced.
Having detailed the purposes, scope, and implementation of the AWA, the
Article now turns to a case study of the predominant enforcement mechanism
used under the Act, official warnings, to assess its efficacy in promoting
compliance with the law.
IV. CASE STUDY: ANIMAL WELFARE ACT WARNINGS AND RECIDIVISM
A. Background and Methodology
Warnings are by far the most commonly utilized enforcement action under
the AWA, consistently comprising more than half of all AWA enforcement
actions. In fiscal year 2017, more than 90% of all enforcement actions taken
under the AWA were wamings. 204 Eighty-eight percent of the remaining
enforcement actions were settlement agreements, while 12% were formal
administrative complaints.20 5
2 03 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
2 04 See Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., supra note 16.
205 Id (reporting fourteen settlements (one nonmonetary and thirteen monetary) and two
formal administrative complaints in fiscal year 2017).
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Figure 2: illustration oflthe Breakdown of AWA Enforcemnt ci I ons
in Fiscal Year 2017
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To determine the extent to which warnings might constitute a credible
threat, the case study also analyzes the frequency and severity of subsequent
enforcement actions faced by those who continued to violate the law after
receiving warnings. Thus, I searched all AWA enforcement documents
published by the USDA to ascertain whether those who received warnings in
2011 subsequently faced enforcement actions of any sort. For those that faced
subsequent monetary penalties, I also calculated and compared the actual final
penalty and the potential statutory maximum penalty.
B. Case Study Findings
1. Rates, Types, and Examples ofRecidivism
The data set of all entities that received warnings in calendar year 2011 and
continued to operate under the same license as of March 2016, when the data
was compiled, included a total of eighty-nine entities. Analysis of the compiled
data revealed that a facility that had previously received a warning was more
likely to commit six or more subsequent violations than it was to commit zero
to one, with a significant percentage-38.5% of those facilities that received
warnings-going on to commit six or more subsequent violations. Moreover,
nearly half of the warned facilities-48.30/-went on to violate one or more of
the specific regulatory subsections for which they previously received a warning
for violating.
In one particularly egregious example, a Minnesota dog breeding facility,
S G Kennels, received a warning in 2011 for violating three different AWA
standards, including the requirement for adequate veterinary care.210 According
to available inspection reports, the facility was cited during every single
subsequent inspection for repeatedly failing to provide adequate veterinary care
to dogs.211 Similarly, a Kansas dog breeder, after receiving a warning for failing
to comply with six AWA requirements, including the veterinary care
James Alm & Jay Shimshack, Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: Lessons from
Pollution, Safety, and Tax Settings, 10 FOUND. & TRENDS VilCROECON. 209, 229 (2014).
2 10 See Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Official Warning
of S. Glenice Viken, S G Kennels (2011); see also 9 C.F.R. § 2.40(b) (2017) (veterinary care
requirement).
211 See Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Inspection Reports
of S. Glenice Viken, S G Kennels (Sept. 21, 2016; July 6, 2016; Apr. 19, 2016; Feb. 10,
2016; Dec. 1, 2015; Sept. 9, 2015; June 16, 2015; June 15, 2015; Apr. 9, 2015; Apr. 1, 2015;
Jan. 15, 2015; Oct. 6, 2014; Nov. 14, 2013).
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requirement,212 also went on to be cited repeatedly for violations, including five
more times for inadequate veterinary care. 213
Another facility, The Gorilla Foundation, where Koko the famous signing
gorilla is held, had a similar pattern of subsequent violations. After receiving an
official warning in 2011 for repeatedly violating the requirement that surfaces
that cannot readily be cleaned be replaced when worn or soiled, 214 The Gorilla
Foundation proceeded to violate this same requirement at least seven more
times. 2 15 Indeed, during every subsequent full inspection, the facility was found
in violation of the requirement. 216
Also concerning were a number of facilities that, after receiving a warning
for failing to be available to be inspected, 217 continued to be cited for the
same. 218 These facilities went for prolonged periods without being inspected,
despite their history of noncompliance, and thus were able to evade regulatory
oversight, which the USDA considers a critical violation. 219
The number of previously warned facilities that were cited for direct
violations-those that are likely to impact the well-being of animals-was also
alarming. More than one-quarter of the facilities in the case study220 were cited
for one or more direct violations after receiving a warning. An even higher
number-thirty-seven, or 41.6%-were subsequently cited for one or more
2 12 See Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Official Warning
of Charlene and Darlene Koster (Sept. 8, 2011).2 13 See Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Inspection Reports
of Charlene and Darlene Koster (June 22, 2015; Mar. 2, 2015; Aug. 11, 2014; Dec. 13, 2014;
June 20, 2013).
214 Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Official Warning of
The Gorilla Foundation (Aug. 3, 2011); see also 9 C.F.R. § 3.75(c)(2).
215 Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Inspection Reports of
The Gorilla Foundation (Dec. 4, 2015; June 17, 2015; Mar. 26, 2015; Dec. 18, 2014; Aug.
20, 2014; Mar. 11, 2014; Dec. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Inspection Reports of The Gorilla
Foundation]. The facility was not cited during the USDA's August 6,2015 or September 24,
2013 inspections for violating this provision, but both of those inspections were focused
inspections. See Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Inspection
Report of The Gorilla Foundation (Aug. 6, 2015); Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv.,
U.S. Dep't of Agric., Inspection Report of The Gorilla Foundation (Sept. 24, 2013); see also
supra note 140 and accompanying text (explaining focused inspections).2 16 See Inspection Reports of The Gorilla Foundation, supra note 215.217 See, e.g., Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Official
Warning of Denise Dickelman (Aug. 22, 2011); Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv.,
U.S. Dep't of Agric., Official Warning of Byron and Loretta Johnson, Grandpa Nicks Petting
Farm (2011).
2 18 See Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Inspection Reports
of Denise Dickelman (Feb. 22, 2016; Dec. 9, 2015; Oct. 28, 2015); Animal & Plant Health
Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Inspection Reports of Byron and Loretta Johnson,
Grandpa Nick's Petting Farm (Nov. 24, 2015; Jan. 29, 2014; Sept. 18, 2013).2 1 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.22 0 Twenty-three out of eighty-nine, or 25.8%.
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repeat violations. 221 Because the "critical" violation designation was only
recently adopted by the USDA and has not yet been incorporated into the
agency's inspection guide, citations for critical violations following receipt of a
warning was not assessed for this case study but should be considered in any
future studies.
The case study revealed that a high number of facilities that received
warnings in 2011 for AWA violations have continued to violate the Act,
including, in many cases, the very same provisions for which they received
warnings for previously violating. Because this finding suggests that warnings
are not acting as a deterrent in a high proportion of cases, indicating that the
regulated community may not perceive the warnings as a credible threat,222 the
next Subpart looks at the rate and severity of subsequent enforcement action
faced by those facilities that continued to violate the AWA after receiving a
warning.
2. Subsequent Enforcement Actions
Of the seventy-seven facilities in the data set that violated the AWA at least
once after receiving a warning (86.5% of the total), thirty-four (44.2%) have
faced some sort of subsequent enforcement action. Some facilities faced more
than one type of subsequent enforcement action. Of those subsequent
enforcement actions, more than half were warnings-including a dog dealer that
received two subsequent warnings 223 (and has continued to violate the AWA
since receiving the third warning224). The breakdown of the subsequent
enforcement actions is shown in Figure 3 below.225
Notably, more than 60% of the subsequently issued warnings were issued
within three years of the prior (2011) warning, 226 in contravention of the
USDA's stated policy that a facility does not qualify for a warning if it has faced
another enforcement action within three years227-thus further diluting the
credibility of the agency's warnings.
221 Again, repeat violations are violations of the same regulatory subsection in two
sequential inspections. See ANIMAL WELFARE INSPECTION GUIDE, supra note 143, at 2-8; see
also supra text accompanying note 143.
222 See supra Part II.
223 See Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Official Warnings
of Lynn Sartin (Jan. 9, 2015; Aug. 5, 2014; Mar. 3, 2011).
224 See Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Inspection Reports
of Lynn Sartin (June 2, 2015; Feb. 24, 2015; Jan. 26, 2015; Dec. 4, 2014; Aug. 27, 2014;
Aug. 20, 2014; Aug. 13, 2014; May 9, 2014; May 8, 2014; May 7, 2014).
225 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Agric. Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., Citation and
Notification of Penalty to David and Joane Cline (Feb. 28, 2013) (assessing a penalty of
$2,786 for sixteen violations on four dates impacting dozens of animals).
226 Sixteen out of twenty-six.
2 2 7 ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV.: ANIMAL CARE, supra note 170, at 12.
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administrative warnings more generally. It also makes recommendations for
both policy changes and further research.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Making Administrative Warnings Credible
Given the limited nature of the USDA's escalation of penalties in the face
of continued AWA violations-in terms of both penalty frequency and size-it
is not surprising that warnings appear to be largely failing to incentivize
compliance. In Ayres and Braithwaite's words, the USDA has put itself in a
"situation where their implied plea to 'cooperate or else' has little
credibility." 230 But this does not have to be the case.
Unlike many agencies that have limited enforcement options and thus
encounter difficulties in trying to design an enforcement pyramid and escalate
penalties,231 the USDA has an array of enforcement options under the Animal
Welfare Act, as discussed in Part M. Indeed, the agency has at its disposal all
of the enforcement actions included in Ayres and Braithwaite's enforcement
pyramid-persuasion, warnings, civil monetary penalties, criminal prosecution,
license suspension, and license revocation 232-as well as additional options,
including cease-and-desist orders (and additional penalties for violating them)
and injunctive relief.233 However, as noted above, the USDA is not currently
taking advantage of all of these options-criminal penalties are virtually never
sought, and there is no indication that injunctive relief has ever been sought in
the more than fifty-year history of the Act. Moreover, it appears that the agency
is likely over-relying on certain enforcement mechanisms-particularly
warnings, and also possibly discounted stipulated penalties-while
underutilizing others. Thus, even in the face of repeated noncompliance and
disregard of warnings, it is rare for the agency to escalate penalties. And even
when the USDA escalates to monetary penalties, as the OIG has repeatedly
noted, the penalties are severely discounted-and sometimes go uncollected-
undermining any deterrent effect they might have.234
Synthesizing these findings with the scholarship discussed in Part II
provides a clear path for the USDA-and other agencies-to follow to likely
enhance compliance by repeat violators. Specifically, the agency should first:
230 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 70, at 36; see also Lochner & Cain, supra note
77, at 1901-02 ("[T]he ability.. to impose-or threaten to impose-a variety of
enforcement sanctions ... ensur[es] that the [regulatory] agency is not forced to choose
between low-cost, low-impact remediation and high-cost, high-impact criminal sanctions.").
See generally supra Part II.23 1 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 70, at 36.
2321d. at 35-36; see also supra Figure 1.
233 See supra Part Ill.
234 See supra Part III.
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(1) Set and follow a clear rubric for escalating penalties when entities that
have received warnings continue to violate the law; and
(2) Revise the stipulated penalty guidelines to ensure higher and more
meaningful civil penalty settlements.
The importance of this second point cannot be overemphasized. As
discussed in Part I, excessive discounting of civil penalties under the AWA is
a longstanding problem. Moreover, there is some empirical analysis supporting
the proposition that imposing a fine that is too low can actually have more
detrimental effects on compliance than imposing no fine at all.235
Over time, the literature suggests that these two steps alone should render
warnings more credible and thus effective in inducing compliance. Thus, while
it might call for a higher number of civil penalties at the outset, the long-term
effect should be to enhance compliance overall and thereby reduce the need for
penalty escalation. Given the paucity of empirical research testing the
theoretical literature, however, the agency would be well-advised to carefully
monitor and assess the effects of such changes.
While these two changes are likely to enhance compliance, they will not
yield perfect compliance and there will still be repeat offenders who, even in the
face of more meaningful monetary penalties, remain undeterred. When these
entities persist in violating the AWA, it is important that the USDA not "[I]op
the top[] off the enforcement pyramid[]" 236-i.e., that it continue to escalate up
the pyramid. Thus, in addition to the measures suggested above, to enhance
AWA compliance and reduce the number of chronic violators, the USDA should
utilize its authority in selected cases to seek criminal prosecution. This likely
means building a strong partnership with the Department of Justice. By virtually
never utilizing the AWA's criminal enforcement provision, the agency has
undermined its ability to obtain compliance. Indeed, while Ayres and
Braithwaite put criminal penalties lower down on the enforcement pyramid than
license revocation and deems the latter "corporate capital punishment," 237
recent examples of individuals who have continued to violate the AWA even
after permanent revocation of their licenses suggest that criminal penalties may
23 5 See Faure, supra note 59, at 326-27 ("[F]ining a polluter with too low a fine can have
a perverse learning effect: firms will then be informed about the low expected sanction,
whereas those who were not confronted with these low sanctions may still wrongly believe
that expected sanctions are higher than they actually are and thus be more induced towards
compliance. The policy implication seems to be that if the agency or court decides to fine a
polluter it is better not to impose any fine at all than one too low, since otherwise one would
destroy wrong, subjective perceptions of potential perpetrators that fines are higher than they
actually are." (footnote omitted) (citing Sandra Rousseau, The Impact of Sanctions and
Inspections on Firms'Environmental Compliance Decisions 17, 19 (Katholieke Universiteit
Leuven, Ctr. for Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 2007-04, 2007))).2 3 6 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 70, at 38-39.2 37 Id. at 53.
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be the only means of incapacitating the worst violators. 238 it is also worth noting
that seeking criminal penalties through judicial enforcement, which has a higher
profile than administrative actions and, especially, settlement decisions, may
have a greater general deterrent effect. In the environmental context, Richard H.
Rosenberg has suggested that a focus on a "stealth system" of "administrative
enforcement emphasizing negotiated settlements and relatively low civil
penalties may provide the regulated community with the idea
that . .. enforcement does not present a serious threat of court enforcement, and
so may not deter noncompliant conduct." 239
Finally, the USDA should more consistently seek license suspension or
revocation for those entities that remain undeterred by lesser penalties. As noted
above, it may be desirable to seek such actions prior to escalating to criminal
enforcement. Because the agency has expressed reticence to seek license
penalties because of the resource intensity and time delays in pursuing full, on-
the-record hearings, it may also wish to explore the possibility of following in
the footsteps of the many agencies that have moved toward more efficient
informal hearing practices that still protect due process interests. 240
B. Accounting for Publicity Effects
One issue that warrants serious further consideration is the extent to which,
perhaps even without increasing the credibility of warnings, publicity effects
might, in some cases, suffice to induce compliance. As discussed in Part III,
Kagan et al. have identified "reputational concerns" as one of three key
motivators of compliance. 241 They note that pressures from those with the
potential to "generate adverse publicity"-such as the media and advocacy
groups-are the primary drivers here.24 2 Other scholars have also elaborated on
the role of publicity in motivating compliance. Given that, as the USDA has
recently noted, "[t]he welfare of animals nationwide continues to attract
significant media attention and passionate public engagement" 243-and given
the current and historical strong public interest in animal welfare244-it is
possible that publicity effects might be particularly strong in the AWA context.
238 See, e.g., Lancelot Kollman Ramos, 74 Agric. Dec. 292, 311-12 (U.S.D.A. 2015);
In re Karl Mitchell, AWA Docket No. 09-0084, at 6-12 (U.S.D.A. Dec. 21, 2010) (decision
and order).
239 Ronald H. Rosenberg, Doing More or Doing Less for the Environment: Shedding
Light on EPA's Stealth Method ofEnvironmental Enforcement, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv.
175, 215 (2008).
24 0 As noted above, the AWA does not mandate full, on-the-record hearings, but the
agency has provided for them through regulation. For a complete discussion of the USDA's
rules of practice, the overall trend toward more informal administrative hearing processes,
and some modifications the USDA might make, see Winders, supra note 127.
241 Kagan et al., supra note 63, at 55 n.2.
24 2 See id at 42.
243 2015 EXPLANATORY NOTES, supra note 16, at 20-127.
244 See supra notes 17-21, 25 and accompanying text.
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Until recently the USDA posted official warnings (and other enforcement
actions) online-and appeared to consider such publication as a deterrent
factor245-but generally did not more actively publicize them. Increasingly,
however, animal advocacy groups and media outlets had begun to draw
attention to these actions. It would be worthwhile to conduct empirical research
on the effects of such publicity, including comparative analyses of subsequent
compliance in cases where enforcement was publicized and in cases where it
was not, and qualitative research in the form of interviews with regulated entities
to develop a sense of the degree to which they are motivated by the possibility
of adverse publicity. Because "the literature is mixed as to when in the legal
process reputational damage is most salient (notice of pending charges, case
announcement, processing, or case resolution)" and as to the relative effects of
civil, criminal, and regulatory actions, 246 if it is possible to collect sufficient data
it also would be useful to compare the impacts of publicity arising from different
types of enforcement actions and at different stages of enforcement. Given that,
in the AWA context, sometimes mere citations also generate negative publicity,
it would also help to compare the publicity effects of citations against those of
warnings to see if the latter do any additional work.
In addition, the USDA might significantly enhance compliance by assigning
a "score" to regulated entities based on AWA inspection report results and
enforcement actions and requiring those entities to disclose that score at points
of sale.
Readily disclosing inspection and enforcement information on its website,
as it did until recently, is an important first step (and one that appears to be
required by the Freedom of Information Act),247 as it has allowed highly
motivated consumers and intermediaries such as animal advocacy groups and
investigative reporters to access and distribute such information. However, the
literature on targeted transparency suggests that disclosure might be rendered
much more effective by making this information available not only on a website
that takes a certain level of investment and sophistication to use, but by also
making it readily available to consumers in a comprehensible way at the time
and place that they make purchasing decisions. 248
Here, restaurant hygiene grading might serve as a model. As experts in
targeted transparency as a regulatory mechanism Archon Fung, Mary Graham,
and David Weil have noted, the window-front restaurant hygiene grades that
have become so familiar have proven highly effective, yielding "measurable
24 5 See 2015 EXPLANATORY NOTES, supra note 16, at 20-50 ("APHIS exercises
immediate deterrent options, such as letters of warning and the publication of such letters on
the internet.").
246 Simpson et al., supra note 67, at 238-39.2 47 See Winders, supra note 17.2 48 ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE 56-57 (2007) ("Information must ... be
compatible with the usual ways that people go about making their
decisions.. . . Compatibility ordinarily includes two elements:format and time and place of
availability.").
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increases in hygiene quality and a consequent significant drop in
hospitalizations from food-related illnesses" as well as "revenue increases for
restaurants with high grades and revenue decreases for C-graded restaurants."24 9
The reason for this success is attributed largely to two factors: First, "everyone
who attended grade school understands the meaning of A, B, and C letter
grades," and second "because grades are posted at the entrance of every
restaurant, they are available to patrons when and where they make dining
decisions." 2 50
Mandated disclosure of an animal welfare "grade" or "score" might have
similar effects and is worth further consideration. Indeed, there is some
preliminary precedent for such efforts. Following concerns raised by the Office
of Inspector General, the USDA began requiring regulated entities to publicly
post their licenses so that the public could ensure that the facility was currently
licensed. However, given that possession of an AWA license says nothing about
compliance (because of the USDA's policy of automatically renewing licenses
regardless of violations 2 51), the meaningfulness of this disclosure is highly
circumscribed. Perhaps more usefully, some jurisdictions have begun requiring
those selling dogs and cats from AWA regulated entities to display "cage tags"
revealing information about the entity supplying the animals. With the website
blackout, however, such laws have become virtually unenforceable. In addition,
such efforts have not utilized a clear grading or scoring system that makes the
information readily comprehensible and useful to consumers. Moreover, even
when inspection reports were readily available online, the presence of
middlemen in the wholesale pet industry posed difficulties for disclosure efforts,
suggesting that targeted disclosure may work better for some categories of
AWA-regulated entities-such as public-facing exhibitors like zoos-than
others.
C. Implications for Other Administrative Regimes
This Article has found that warnings are heavily relied on to enforce the
Animal Welfare Act but appear to be largely ineffective in incentivizing
compliance, rendering the USDA's reliance on them problematic. Given the
heavy reliance on warnings across agencies, and the paucity of empirical
research on their effectiveness, 2 52 it is highly unlikely that the AWA example is
aberrant.
Indeed, what data is available suggests that, like the USDA in the Animal
Welfare Act context, other agencies that rely on warnings are also failing to
249 Id. at 83.
250Id at 56-57; see also Oren Bar-Gill, Defending (Smart) Disclosure: A Comment on
More than You Wanted To Know, 11 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STuD. 75, 76 (2015)
("[S]implification using 'scores'[]may be the key to effective disclosure in important
contexts.").
251 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
2 5 2 See supra Part II.
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escalate penalties when their warnings go unheeded. A review of state and local
enforcement of air and water quality regulations in the United States found that
the vast majority of notices of violations never resulted in penalties, and even in
the few instances where penalties were imposed, they were "very small." 253 i
2009, only 5.65% of entities that received warnings or notices of violation from
the Ohio EPA's surface water division were subjected to a formal enforcement
action. 254 While it is possible that escalated penalties are few and far between
because the warnings are in fact incentivizing compliance, it seems unlikely
based on the literature and the available information and, at a minimum,
warrants further study.
In other contexts, it appears that agencies may not even be following up on
warnings to assess for subsequent compliance. For example, warning letters sent
by the Food and Drug Administration state that the recipient must provide proof
of corrective action, and a close-out letter "may issue when, based on FDA's
evaluation, the firm has taken corrective action to address the violations
contained in the Warning Letter," 255 but "[flor all Warning Letters sent, a small
percentage have been 'closed out' according to the FDA's database and an even
smaller percentage have letters of response from the responsible business." 256
In addition, searches of the FDA's tobacco retailer compliance check database
suggest that a huge number of retailers that have received warnings from the
agency have not been subsequently inspected. 257
These are but a few examples. As discussed in Part II, warnings are nearly
ubiquitous, relied on across an array of regulatory regimes. In addition to a host
of federal agencies, warnings are used by a variety of state agencies and
internationally. We know very little about whether or when these warnings
motivate compliance. Accordingly, there is a significant need for analysis of
2 5 3 CLIFFORD S. RUSSELL ET AL., ENFORCING POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 39 (1986).254 David Emerman, Note, An Environmental Law Even Judge Learned Hand Would
Violate: Ohio EPA Needs Non-Monetary Penalties To Enforce Construction NPDES
Permits, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 275, 290 nn.147-48 (2012) (citing Enforcement Program,
OIno ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http-//www.epa.ohio.gov/dsw/enforcement/enf.aspx
[https-/perma.cc/K4
H2-L5XJ]).
2 5 5 About Warning and Close-Out Letters, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.tda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/amingLetters/ucm278624.htm htps-//perma.
cc/3CFQ-LKJN] (last updated Jan. 29, 2018).2 56 Jennifer L. Pomeranz, A Comprehensive Strategy to Overhaul FDA Authority for
Misleading Food Labels, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 617, 633 (2013) (footnote omitted) (citing
Warning Letters, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/Wamingtters/defaulthtm [https-/permacc/UF
S3-33Y2] (follow "Browse Warning Letters with Response Letters" hyperlink; or follow
"Browse Warning Letters with Closeout Letters" hyperlink)) (last updated Apr. 17, 2018)
(citing to the FDA website showing lists of Warning Letters that have associated Close-Out
Letters or Response Letters).2 57 Compliance Check Inspections of Tobacco Product Retailers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., httpJ/www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/oce/inspections/oceinspsearching.cfm [https://
perma.cc/Q6TP-J28Z] (last updated May 28, 2018).
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warnings and their efficacy in other administrative contexts. Until such research
is conducted, administrative agencies' heavy reliance on warnings is, as
Glicksman and Earnhart have cautioned, "more of an act of faith than a rational
policy choice." 258
VI. CONCLUSION
Administrative agencies rely heavily on warnings as an enforcement
mechanism, despite the fact that economic models of public enforcement
suggest that warnings should have no role in motivating compliance. While
alternate enforcement theories, including responsive regulation, suggest that
there may be a role for warnings, there has been virtually no analysis of their
efficacy.
The literature suggests that warnings might be effective where they are part
of an enforcement pyramid, but makes clear that if penalties are not escalated
when warnings are disregarded, then agencies are likely to lose credibility and
warnings will effectively be rendered meaningless.
This case study of compliance behavior by entities regulated by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture under the Federal Animal Welfare Act suggests that
warnings are failing to incentivize compliance in a large proportion of cases.
Based on the literature, this is likely the result of the USDA's failure to escalate
penalties for the majority of entities that continue to violate the law after
receiving a warning. The USDA's warnings could likely be rendered more
credible-and thus more effective-if the USDA begins to more consistently
and meaningfully escalate enforcement in the face of ongoing noncompliance.
These findings, combined with the heavy reliance on warnings across the
agencies and the paucity of data on their effectiveness, should serve as a wake-
up call to agencies that are blindly relying on warnings. There is a significant
need for further research in a variety of contexts if administrative agencies are
going to continue to rely on warnings as an enforcement tool.
258 Glicksman & Earnhart, supra note 60, at 608 n.24.
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